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GAIN-SHARING, SUCCESS- 
SHARING AND COST-BASED 
PRICING 
"In principle... a system ought to 
encourage individuals to do what is right 
by rewarding them for carrying out... 
desirable policies" 
(Weitzman [1976] p.251) 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to model a 
new incentive structure for government ac- 
tivities that rewards cost-savings and effi- 
ciencies. The model combines "cost-based 
pricing" (see Pavia [1995]) with the popular 
business practice of "gain-sharing" (see 
Welbourne & Mejia [1995]), and a new in- 
centive program we call "success-sharing". 
The first section of the paper reviews 
these three concepts. The next section iden- 
tifies incentive problems that result from 
traditional public budgeting practices and 
offers cost-based "transfer pricing" as an 
alternative. The third section explores on- 
going efforts to implement a transfer pric- 
ing system in the Department of Defense 
(DoD). The paper concludes by offering a 
new budgeting approach that integrates 
cost-based transfer pricing with gain-shar- 
ing and success-sharing. 
Under "fully-distributed" cost-based 
pricing, firms allocate all costs to their var- 
ious outputs and then use those costs to set 
prices. (Pavia [1995] p.1060) In a study of 
over 500 Fortune 1000 firms, 83 percent 
*I would like to thank Jim Blandin, Schroeder Dodds, 
Paul Hough, lim Howard, CJ. LaCivita, Philippe 
Michel, Andy Rumbaugh, Neil Seiden, Mike Stroup 
and two reviewers of this journal for helpful com- 
ments and suggestions. The views expressed are my 
own. They do not necessarily reflect the policy of the 
U.S. Navy, the Office of the Under Secretary of De- 
fense (Comptroller), or the Department of Defense. 
(*)The Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF) that 
I refer to in this paper has recently been replaced by 
what is called the Defense Working Capital Funds. 
The name has been changed to protect the innocent. 
For the purposes of my paper, all of the operating 
concepts of revolving funds are still in effect. The 
break-up of DBOF into five separate working capital 
funds re-emphasizes the management oversight re- 
sponsibility each of the Services has for their activities. 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comp- 
troller (OUSDC) still develops policy and has over- 
sight responsibilities for review of the Services Work- 
ing Capital Fund budgets. The day-to-day 
management of the Defense Working Capital Funds 
facilities remains firmly in the hands of the Services. 
reported using fully-distributed costs to es- 
tablish prices. (Govindarajan & Anthony 
[1983]) Government mandates also require 
many regulated firms, such as public utili- 
ties, to use cost-based pricing, (see Vogel- 
sang& Finsinger [1979], Laffont & Tirole 
[1986], and Sappington & Sibley [1988]) 
Another important application of cost- 
based pricing is in the construction of 
"transfer prices." (e.g. see Benke & Ed- 
wards [1980] or Magee [1986]) Many large, 
complex, vertically-integrated organiza- 
tions include separate activities that con- 
duct internal exchanges of goods and ser- 
vices. The challenge faced by these 
organizations is to govern the relationships 
among internal activities to promote the 
goals of the organization as a whole. Many 
private firms solve this problem through 
the use of internal transfer prices. 
Two important lessons come out of the 
transfer pricing literature, (e.g. see Kovac & 
Troy [1989], Eccles [1985], Bruns & Kaplan 
[1987], and Rogerson [1995]) First, to pro- 
mote the goals of the organization, transfer 
prices must correctly reflect costs. Second, 
internal activities must somehow be re- 
warded for using transfer price signals to 
pursue organizational goals. These two les- 
sons hint at a model that combines a cost- 
based transfer pricing system with a pro- 
gram of organizational incentives. 
This paper applies lessons from the 
transfer pricing literature to a unique sub- 
set of government activities—those that 
"earn" their budgets. Internal DoD support 
activities financed through the Defense 
Business Operations Fund (DBOF) offer an 
illustration. Charging their "customers" 
(operating forces) regulated cost-based 
transfer1 prices, DBOF activities "... sell 
goods or services to customers with the 
intent of recovering the total cost of provid- 
ing those goods and services." (DBOF 
Handbook [1995] p. 2-1) 
Unfortunately, it is well documented 
that, by itself, "... cost-based pricing may 
introduce economic inefficiencies such as 
the failure... to control costs of production 
and a lack of incentives... to invest in cost- 
reducing innovations." (Pavia [1995] 
p.1061)2 This observation is troublesome in 
the case of DBOF. Designed to "foster a 
business-like customer /provider ap- 
proach" the aim of DBOF was to "improve 
the delivery of support services to the De- 
partment's operating forces while reducing 
the cost of operations." (DBOF Hand- 
book[1995] p.1-1) 
Along with DBOF, four approaches 
have been discussed to help reduce the cost 
of support in DoD: i.) "outsourcing" and 
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"privatization",3 ii.) competition, iii.) deregula- 
tion, and iv.) organizational incentives (see the 
SECDEF's Annual Report [1996], and Direc- 
tions for Defense (DD) [1995]). The first two 
approaches arc outward looking. They focus on 
the opportunity for current DoD support to be 
provided by private firms. The last two ap- 
proaches are inward looking. They focus on 
improving conditions under which work is cur- 
rently done within DoD.4 
This paper is inward looking. It focuses on 
internal DoD budgeting and management is- 
sues, and the role of organizational incentives. 
The dual objective of the paper is: first, to offer 
a framework to help upper-level management 
evaluate organizational incentives in cost-based 
pricing systems; and second, to persuade the 
Operations Research Community to join in this 
effort to model critical budgeting issues. 
Citing the need to "reduce the cost of sup- 
port to help fund higher priority needs," the 
Congressionally mandated Report of the Com- 
mission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces 
(DD [1995]) recommends that the DoD "reduce 
the cost of. . . support. . . through increased out- 
sourcing and better management." (p.ES-3) The 
Department is encouraged to identify its "core 
competencies" or "inherently governmental 
functions" and outsource or privatize other re- 
sponsibilities. (p.ES-6) The Report concludes 
that remaining functions "can benefit... by 
pursuing business practices used in the pri- 
vate sector" (DDp.3-1), and urges the adoption 
of "[b]etter organizational incentives. .. " 
(DD[1995] p.4-16). 
The Secretary of Defense generally con- 
curs/ emphasizing that (together with the Mil- 
itary Departments) the DoD Comptroller and 
various Under Secretaries have been "... exam- 
ining new approaches to create incentives for 
achieving greater savings and efficiencies. . . " 
(SECDEF WJ Perry, DoD News Release No. 
470-95, 8/25/95 p.'lO) This paper combines a 
model of cost-based pricing with two incentive 
programs designed to reward cost-savings: 
gain-sharing and success-sharing. 
The goal of gain-sharing is to encourage 
activities to make an effort to reduce current 
costs in return for some of the immediate gains 
from the cost savings. In a cost-based pricing 
system, cost-savings occur whenever an activ- 
ity succeeds in driving its actual total costs 
below its "earned" budget. Under gain-sharing 
a portion of the cost-savings is rebated to the 
activity as a reward (in the form of employee 
bonuses, extra vacation time, etc.). However, a 
recent survey article by Welbourne & Mejia 
[1995] expresses concern that, while numerous 
case studies suggest gain-sharing can help 
bring costs down over time,6 "[t]he bulk of the 
extensive gainsharing literature is atheoretical 
and exploratory in nature." (p.584) 
The dynamic, discrete-time optimization 
model introduced in this paper helps to address 
this concern. Moreover, this simple determinis- 
tic model leads to an important discovery. 
Gain-sharing alone may not be enough. The 
dynamics of the model suggest that while gain- 
sharing is necessary to encourage cost-savings, 
it may not be sufficient. Under certain condi- 
tions, what we call "success-sharing" is re- 
quired to complement gain-sharing in order for 
an activity to have a sufficient incentive to in- 
vest in cost-reducing innovations. 
Success-sharing offers an additional oppor- 
tunity to reward activities. Suppose a "perma- 
nent" stream of cost-savings is obtained from a 
cost-reducing innovation. Success-sharing 
takes place when the success of the cost savings 
generated over time is shared with the activity 
responsible for those savings. However, it is 
more common for the success of cost savings 
not to be shared with the activity responsible 
for the savings. Instead, future cost savings are 
typically passed along to customers in the form 
of reduced prices in future periods. 
For example, the stated policy for setting 
transfer prices charged by DBOF providers is 
that: "If costs are reduced, then prices will be 
reduced the following year to pass along the 
savings to the customer." (Business Manage- 
ment Directorate [1993]) Thus "[rjeduced".. 
costs translate to reduced prices. .. " (Isosaari 
[1996]p.l7) However, providers "have to be 
confident that prices will stay high enough to 
recoup [investments in cost-reducing innova- 
tions]. . . [since] if once investments arc made, 
regulators slash prices, [those providers] may 
be leery of investing again." ("The Regulaton' 
Experiment," The Economist, Jan. 28, 1995 p.64) 
In the case of DBOF, investment costs for 
both capital assets and management improve- 
ments are recovered through depreciation ex- 
penses (or "capital surcharges") factored into 
future year rates. In general, under gain-shar- 
ing, activities face a difficult trade-off. While 
cost-reduction efforts increase current-year 
pay-outs, resulting price cuts tend to squeeze 
potential gains from future cost savings. Unless 
future revenues are discounted at an unreason- 
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ably high rate, gain-sharing alone may not be 
sufficient to encourage investments in cost-re- 
ducing innovations. In this case success-sharing 
has an important role to play. 
Success-sharing refers to the degree to 
which any "permanent" savings are shared be- 
tween customers and the activity responsible 
for the cost savings. By definition, there is no 
success-sharing if the activity responsible for 
the cost savings does not share in the perma- 
nent stream of savings. In this case, any long- 
run benefits are enjoyed entirely by customers 
who pay new lower prices that fully reflect the 
cost savings. 
Multiyear defense contracts offer an illus- 
tration. These contracts are often written in 
such a way that they effectively guarantee de- 
fense firms 100% gain-sharing, but no success- 
sharing. According to Rogerson [1994], the 
"DoD essentially makes the following bargain 
with the firm. In return for revealing its ability 
to lower costs, DoD will let the firm keep the 
benefits [the difference between the negotiated 
price and actual costs] for the duration of the 
multiyear in which costs are lowered."(p.78) 
These "benefits" correspond to 100% gain-shar- 
ing over the period of the contract. However, 
"on subsequent contracts, DoD will take the 
benefits itself."(p.78) Thus, "when a defense 
firm discovers a way to lower its production 
costs, previously negotiated prices are not 
changed. Firms are able to keep profits created 
by such cost reductions until negotiations take 
this new efficiency into account and lower 
prices on future contracts."(p.72) Any profits 
earned through cost reductions can be thought 
of as pay-outs from a 100% gain-sharing pro- 
gram. However, since future contracts translate 
the firm's cost reductions directly into lower 
prices, there is no success-sharing. 
Success-sharing only takes place if, in sub- 
sequent periods, the regulated (or "negotiat- 
ed") price is "stabilized" or only partially ratch- 
eted down. In this case, while customers (e.g. 
the DoD) might still enjoy the benefit of new 
lower prices, those prices do not fully reflect the 
cost-savings achieved. Thus, success-sharing 
offers an extra incentive to suppliers to lower 
costs, since they are allowed to capture part of 
the future stream of benefits from their cost- 
reducing investments.7 
The next section briefly introduces manage- 
ment implications of traditional public budget- 
ing practices, and offers cost-based transfer 
pricing as an alternative. Although internal 
DoD support activities are used as an illustra- 
tion, the results of the paper are not unique to 
Defense. The model applies to any regulated 
activity subject to unit-cost-based (transfer) 
pricing. The third section explores ongoing ef- 
forts to implement transfer pricing in DoD. The 
fourth and fifth sections model a new budget- 
ing approach that combines cost-based transfer 
pricing with gain-sharing and success-sharing. 
The model's notation, assumptions, and sta- 
tionary equilibrium are presented and dis- 
cussed. An interpretation of the results, some 
policy guidance, and directions for future re- 
search appear in the concluding section. 
TRADITIONAL BUDGETING VS 
COST-BASED TRANSFER PRICING 
In traditional public budgeting systems, 
government activities submit budget requests 
each fiscal year to cover the costs of their oper- 
ations. For example, internal DoD "providers" 
(support activities) that operate under direct 
appropriations first submit a budget to Con- 
gress, and then receive appropriated funds to 
generate support for their "customers" (operat- 
ing forces). 
Unfortunately, the traditional budgeting 
approach has several drawbacks. First, from the 
point of view of providers, an old adage con- 
cerning the appropriate size of budgets is re- 
vealing: "some is good, more is better, and... 
too much is just right." In principle, budget 
requests are formulated by providers to cover 
the expected costs of satisfying their customer's 
requirements. In practice, there is little incen- 
tive for support activities to request smaller 
budgets—even in periods of "down-sizing." 
Thus, according to Niskanen [1971], Fox [1988], 
Rogerson [1994], and others, under traditional 
budgeting there is a built-in bias to "maximize 
budgets" rather than to seek cost-savings. 
A parallel issue is that customers (operating 
forces)—and not providers—are usually in a 
better position to determine the level of support 
they require. Thus, under traditional budgeting 
a real concern in DoD is that "[m]erely reduc- 
ing our military—in and of itself—will not ad- 
dress the problem of controlling support costs 
which, if left unchecked will steal scarce re- 
sources from the operating forces." (Maroni 
[1993]p.2) 
Another drawback to traditional budgeting 
is that, while operating forces are in the best 
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position to determine their own support re- 
quirements, thev remain largely insulated from 
cost concerns. In contrast, support activities 
that receive direct appropriations arc forced to 
tackle cost issues every time they submit a bud- 
get. Thus providers tend to be more aware of 
the cost implications of different levels (and 
composition) of support than arc the customers 
that receive that support. In fact, under this 
svstem, customers sometimes view support as 
"free." 
Unless budgets are unlimited, resource 
management decisions at all levels, including 
the operations level, need to take resource costs 
into account in order to maximize effectiveness 
(i.e. readiness, deterrence, or combat capabili- 
ty). However, under traditional budgeting "... 
operating forces [have] neither the responsibil- 
ity nor the flexibility to make trade-off deci- 
sions in determining the optimal amount of 
support required to sustain readiness." 
(Maroni[1993]p.3) 
Finally, traditional budgeting tends to pun- 
ish cost savings, manufacture inefficiencies, 
and often contributes to an explosion of rules 
and regulations. A noted authority on public 
budgeting observes that "if departments save 
money, thev run the risk the government will 
recapture the savings,. . . [and thus] efficient 
departments may be penalized while inefficient 
ones are rewarded." (Schick [1988] p.531) 
Worse vet, cost savings achieved one year make 
it harder to secure requested budgets in subse- 
quent years: "A bureaucrat who failed to spend 
[or obligate] his entire budget would be in dan- 
ger of having his budget cut the next year." 
(Stiglitz [1986]p.l73) Thus traditional budget- 
ing tends to manufacture inefficiencies by lead- 
ing to familiar "use-it-or-losc-it" year-end 
spending sprees.* 
The typical bureaucratic response to com- 
bat year-end spending sprees is to impose a 
detailed set of guidelines that constrains activ- 
ities' spending, and the timing of that spending, 
through the fiscal year. This leads to new, con- 
straining regulations, and to costly monitoring 
and auditing of activities9 One particularly in- 
sidious consequence is that government man- 
agers increasingly view their role as insuring 
strict compliance with regulations and "pro- 
tecting" programs, not in cutting costs or in- 
creasing efficiencies. Thus adding layers of reg- 
ulations further handcuffs management 
without addressing the underlying perverse in- 
centives to avoid cost-savings.10 Acknowledg- 
ing these problems, the principal deputy 
Comptroller of DoD, Alice Maroni [1993], em- 
phasizes that managers: "... need to move 
from a mindset focused on how fast can appro- 
priated funds be obligated and spent, to how 
much can the cost of certain goods and services 
be reduced." (p.2) 
On the basis of these observations, a good 
alternative to traditional budgeting would: a) 
satisfy customer demands, b) increase cost vis- 
ibility, c) reduce the burden of excessive rules 
and regulations, and d) reward cost-savings 
and efficiencies. In DoD, this would have the 
dual impact of lowering support costs while 
improving the timeliness and quality of sup- 
port provided to operating forces. 
A cost-based transfer pricing system offers 
one alternative to traditional budgeting. A per- 
manent concern of top management of large 
firms and organizations is to insure that users 
of internally supplied intermediate (or "sup- 
port") products make efficient use of those 
products in producing final outputs. Another 
concern is to insure that internal providers sup- 
ply those products as efficiently as possible. A 
standard solution adopted by commercial firms 
is to use internal transfer prices. (Magee [1986]) 
In a transfer pricing system, "customers" of 
internally supplied intermediate products pur- 
chase those products from internal "providers." 
The cost-based transfer prices charged for these 
intermediate products are designed to encour- 
age customers to make efficient decisions by 
making them aware of the cost of producing 
those products. Meanwhile, combining cost- 
based transfer pricing with organizational in- 
centives (gain-sharing and success-sharing), 
and/or with the threat of competition (from 
internal sources, or from outsourcing), can help 
drive internal providers to make more efficient 
production and investment decisions.11 
The general consensus is that for transfer 
prices to provide the most efficient resource 
allocation signals, they should be based on 
marginal costs—the additional costs of produc- 
ing the last unit of an intermediate product, 
(e.g. see Rogerson [1995]) In practice, however, 
transfer pricing systems are often based on unit 
costs—calculated by dividing the total costs of 
producing an intermediate product over some 
period, by the number of units produced that 
period. 
Three accounting characteristics help ex- 
plain the popularity of unit-cost-based transfer 
pricing systems: First, traditional accounting 
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systems were not designed to collect marginal 
cost data, and in any case, unit cost calculations 
are less data-intensive. Second, unlike econo- 
mist's who assume a "U-shaped" (or quadratic) 
average total cost curve (where unit costs are 
high at low output levels, fall to a minimum as 
output expands, and then increase again as out- 
put expands further), an (often implicit) ac- 
counting convention is to assume that unit 
costs are independent of output. If unit costs 
are constant over a wide range of production, 
then this implies marginal costs equal unit costs 
over that range. Finally, in the case of multi- 
product firms, overhead (G&A) costs are diffi- 
cult to assign to specific units of a single prod- 
uct. Instead, overhead is typically spread over 
the various products according to some rule, 
and then averaged into the price/cost charged 
for specific units of a product, (e.g. see Roger- 
son [1995]) 
A first simplifying assumption of the 
model is that transfer prices are set on the basis 
of unit costs. A second simplifying assumption 
is that all relevant costs can be directly assigned 
to individual outputs.12 The next section re- 
views the transfer pricing system currently im- 
plemented in DoD, and develops some addi- 
tional assumptions for the new budgeting 
model that follows. 
UNIT-COST-BASED TRANSFER 
PRICING 
The most widespread use of cost-based 
transfer pricing in a government setting is 
found in DoD's Defense Business Operations 
Fund (DBOF). The DBOF was established in 
October 1991 by the Secretary of Defense.13 It 
consists of all supply and logistics organiza- 
tions ("providers") within DoD that sell their 
outputs to other organizations ("customers") 
within DoD. Over $70 billion per year of sup- 
port (almost one third of the defense budget) is 
funded under DBOF, and over 300,000 civilian 
and military personnel are employed in DBOF 
activities. This section focuses on some key con- 
cepts used in budgeting support activities un- 
der DBOF and contrasts current DBOF policies 
with new policy proposals offered in the 
model. 
In order to be included in the DBOF finan- 
cial structure as a "business area," support 
functions must meet four criteria: i.) outputs 
can be identified; ii.) an approved accounting 
system is available; iii.) customers can be iden- 
tified; and iv.) benefit/costs of establishing a 
buyer-seller relationship can be evaluated. 
(DBOF Handbook [1995]) Business areas in- 
clude logistics activities that distribute, main- 
tain and replace materiel to give combat units 
the equipment and support services they need, 
when they need them. Examples of DBOF busi- 
ness areas include: supply management, in- 
cluding the purchase, maintenance, storage, re- 
pair, and transportation of supplies and 
equipment; financial and accounting services; 
publications services; commissaries; informa- 
tion services; and some research and develop- 
ment.14 
The purpose of DBOF was to "more closely 
relate the support infrastructure with the force 
structure" and to "improve the delivery of sup- 
port services... while reducing the cost." 
(DBOF Handbook [1995]p.l-l) Four specific ob- 
jectives are cited in the DBOF Handbook: (1) to 
"identify the full cost of support;" (2) to "mea- 
sure performance on the basis of cost/output 
(i.e. unit cost) goals;" (3) to "reduce DoD sup- 
port costs through better business practices;" 
and (4) to "foster efficiency and productivity 
improvements." (p.1-3) Each objective is briefly 
discussed below. 
(1) "Identify the full cost of support": The 
ultimate goal is to reveal all labor, materials 
and capital costs that contribute to each output 
of a given support activity at as disaggregated 
a level as possible. This increased cost visibility 
is designed to facilitate the cost accounting re- 
quired to derive cost-based transfer prices 
"charged" to customers of DBOF activities. 
The full cost of support includes civilian 
labor, military labor, material, and other direct 
costs, depreciation expenses, property mainte- 
nance, and "acceleration of labor" (i.e. the cost 
of fringe benefits). In a multi-product organiza- 
tion, the development of activity-based costing 
(ABC) can help to identify the full cost of sup- 
port.15 (Brimson [1991]) For ease of exposition, 
the model focuses on support functions that 
produce at least one measurable output to 
which all relevant costs can be assigned. 
(2) "Measure performance on the basis of cost/ 
output (i. e. unit cost) goals": Dividing a support 
activity's total costs in one period by the output 
produced that period yields an average total 
cost measure. Analogous to the accountant's 
constant unit cost assumption, under limited 
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(or asymmetric) information, this average total 
cost measure can be used as an estimate of the 
unit cost of support in a subsequent period. 
"Organizations financed through DBOF 
sell goods or services to 'customers' with the 
intent of recovering the total cost of providing 
those goods and services." (DBOF Handbook 
[1995]p.2-l) This can be accomplished in two 
wavs: First, through direct budget authority 
based on unit cost targets, or second, by allow- 
ing the activity to "earn" its budget through 
sales to customers at (transfer) prices which 
cover its costs. 
In the first case, budget authority is pro- 
vided equal to a support activity's total yearly 
output multiplied by its unit cost target. In this 
case the unit cost target set by OSD as the 
regulator of an activity could be thought of as 
the price paid bv OSD as the final customer of 
that activity's product. This is particularly use- 
ful in the case where support activities offer 
significant "positive externalities." For exam- 
ple, when benefits are not completely captured 
bv individual customers and "spill-over" to the 
DoD as a whole (e.g. like joint US-International 
defense management education), such activities 
can be "centrally funded" (using unit-cost- 
based price targets) by a single "customer" 
(such as OSD) who acts as a representative for 
the larger interests of DoD as a whole.16 
The second case reflects current DoD policy 
as represented by DBOF. In this case, rather 
than support activities receiving unit-cost- 
based budget appropriations, customers (i.e. 
operational commands) request budgets to ac- 
commodate their support purchases. In turn, 
support activities arc authorized to sell their 
outputs to customers at regulated cost-based 
transfer prices designed to cover their total 
costs. Unit cost goals can then be used as a 
measure of efficiency by comparing "actual 
unit cost experience against planned corporate 
expectations." (DBOF Handbook [1995] p.3-16) 
(3) "Reduce DoD support costs through better 
business practices": Within business areas, 
support organizations (providers) operate like 
commercial businesses, selling goods and ser- 
vices to customers. Customers establish their 
requirements and arc charged for the cost of the 
products or services provided.1' Thus DBOF 
providers "earn" their budgets based on the 
quantity of goods and services they sell. Under 
DBOF, customers—typically combat or operat- 
ing units—fund their requests with appropria- 
tions from Congress (i.e. with Procurement, 
Operations & Maintenance (O&M), and/or Re- 
search, Development, Test & Evaluation 
(RDT&E) money). The expectation is that 
"when these costs are. .. visible to the operat- 
ing forces they will. . . make better resource 
allocation decisions in determining the levels of 
support they require for day-to-day opera- 
tions." (Maroni [1993]p.3) Thus DBOFcreates a 
"business" (or "customer-provider") relation- 
ship between military operating forces and 
support organizations. More importantly, it 
helps to link mission operations with the cost to 
support those operations. 
Military Departments and Defense Agen- 
cies that have business areas financed under 
DBOF arc responsible for the day-to-day man- 
agement and operation of their respective busi- 
ness areas. However, when it comes to setting 
transfer prices, "[t]here arc few restrictions by 
actual statute on DBOF activities in the estab- 
lishment of rates." (Isosaari [1996]p.l9) 
The Military Departments establish prices 
with oversight provided by the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
(OUSD(C)).ls Since OUSD(C) has oversight re- 
sponsibility for generating unit-cost-based 
transfer prices, it effectively acts as the price 
regulator for support activities. Another as- 
sumption of the model is that the Comptroller 
(OUSD(C)) regulates transfer prices with the 
objective of encouraging cost reductions over 
time. 
(4) "Foster efficiency and productivity improve- 
ments": A primary difference between DBOF 
business areas and private firms is that, by 
Congressional statute, DBOF activities must 
operate on a cumulative, non-profit (or "break- 
even") basis. Thus, activities financed under 
DBOF sell their goods and services to custom- 
ers with the sole intent of recovering the total 
cost of providing those goods and services: 
"DBOF businesses strive to break even in prices 
charged to customers." (DBOF Handbook 
[1993]) 
However, as a DBOF business area sells 
goods or services, it earns revenues. The differ- 
ence between revenues from sales and the ac- 
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tual costs incurred at any point in time is called 
the "Net Operating Result" (NOR). In general, 
during budget execution, a business area's 
NOR will either be positive (indicating profits) 
or negative (indicating losses). The "Accumu- 
lated Operating Result" (AOR) is the ultimate 
profit or loss realized from the operations of the 
business activity. Ideally, DBOF prices are set 
to achieve an AOR in the budget year of zero 
(see DBOF Handbook [1995]. 
According to the DBOF Handbook [1995]: 
"[R]ates must be adjusted by the activity's man- 
ager to offset prior year gains or losses, thereby 
achieving zero net profit and loss." (p.20) Thus 
activities are penalized with tougher targets 
(i.e. lower prices) for cost reductions that lead 
to a positive NOR. The struggle to break-even 
can lead to inefficient behavior. In a recent 
study, Pavia [1995] emphasizes that unit-cost- 
based transfer pricing alone may not be suffi- 
cient to induce providers to lower costs. 
(p.1061) In the absence of further cost controls 
(e.g. from detailed regulations, organizational 
incentives, or the threat of competition), DBOF 
activities' lack of a profit motive could "lead to 
large losses, taking years to recoup, and may 
lead to unusually high rates that may cause the 
alienation of valued customers." (Friend 
[1995]p.4) Since losses lead to price increases in 
subsequent years, as rates climb, further reduc- 
tions in customer demand could force provid- 
ers to spread fixed costs over fewer units, thus 
driving prices up even higher, eventually lead- 
ing to what Friend [1995] has called the "death 
spiral." (p.5) One "... complaint about DBOF 
has been the rapid boosting of... rates." (Friend 
[1995]p.ll) However, the DBOF Handbook 
[1995] emphasizes that: "the primary responsi- 
bility of DBOF activities is to provide services 
and products to its customers at the lowest 
cost." (p.21)19 
This paper offers a new framework that 
helps address these issues. The model com- 
bines unit-cost-based transfer pricing with two 
organizational incentive programs designed to 
foster efficiency and productivity improve- 
ments: "gain-sharing" and "success-sharing". 
Under "gain-sharing," a portion of any sur- 
plus (or "profits") due to cost-reductions is re- 
bated to the activity in the form of employee 
bonuses, extra vacation time, etc. Under "suc- 
cess-sharing," rather than cutting future trans- 
fer prices to eliminate "accumulated profits," 
prices are ratcheted down to reflect a part, but 
not all of the cost reductions achieved. Thus, 
while success-sharing allows customers to ben- 
efit from cost reductions, it also rewards sup- 
port activities with part of the future stream of 
benefits from their cost-reducing innovations. 
A useful, if imperfect analogy (and a possible 
way to distribute benefits derived from gain- 
sharing and success-sharing) is offered by cur- 
rent compensation practices familiar to some 
public sector wage earners. Gain-sharing 
would be similar to a (one-time) lump-sum bo- 
nus or a "merit increase," while success-sharing 
would be comparable to a performance-based 
promotion to a higher wage category or a "step 
increase" (a permanent increase in wage). 
The next section introduces a model which 
illustrates analytically the incentives created by 
gain-sharing and the more potent incentives 
offered through success-sharing. The results of 
the model indicate that when support activities 
can invest in one period to lower their unit 
costs in a subsequent period, gain-sharing is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition to create 
the incentives for them to do so. Success-shar- 
ing may be required to augment gain-sharing 
in order to encourage cost reductions over time. 
THE MODEL 
Assuming that "the primary responsibility 
of DBOF activities is to provide services and 
products to its customers at the lowest cost" 
(DBOF Handbook [1995]p.21), this section 
models a new budgeting approach for the De- 
partment of Defense. The objective of the model 
is to develop an incentive structure for internal 
support activities that rewards cost-savings 
and efficiencies. The model combines cost- 
based transfer pricing with the popular busi- 
ness practice of gain-sharing, and a new incen- 
tive program we call "success-sharing." Gain- 
sharing and success-sharing programs 
encourage support activities to lower costs by 
offering the opportunity to reward employees 
for cost-reducing innovations.20 
The DoD Comptroller (OUSD(C)) currently 
has oversight responsibility for cost-based 
transfer prices set under DBOF. The Comptrol- 
ler "finalizes and approves the stabilized rates 
Military Operations Research, V3 Nl 1997 Page 29 
GAIN-SHARING, SUCCESS-SHARING AND COST-BASED PRICING 
that business activities may charge customers 
in a Program Budget Decision (PBD)." (Friend 
[1995]p.7) As a consequence, the Comptroller is 
modeled as a regulator (or "planner"), who sets 
maximum allowable transfer prices charged by 
sole providers of "core" support outputs. 
The Comptroller's underlying objective in 
the model is to motivate activities to uncover 
and exploit cost-reducing innovations. The 
Comptroller offers gain-sharing and success- 
sharing programs, and regulates unit-cost- 
bascd transfer prices, to reward unit-cost re- 
ductions over time. Meanwhile, support 
activities seek investment strategies in unit- 
cost-reducing innovations that maximize the 
discounted present value of their rewards from 
gain-sharing and success-sharing programs, 
while simultaneously satisfying customer de- 
mands. The analysis begins with a discussion of 
the "principal's" (i.e. Comptroller's) problem, 
and then focuses on decisions taken by the 
"agents" (i.e. support activities). The model re- 
veals conditions under which agents are likely 
to carrv out the principal's objectives. 
The model assumes each business area con- 
sists of a single support activity that produces 
one primary output, Q, to which all relevant 
costs can be assigned (where Q refers to the 
quantity of output or "workload" i.e. the num- 
ber of units produced and sold per period). If 
the total cost function is given by TC(Q), then 
TC(Q)/Q = C(Q) arc average total (or "unit") 
costs, while marginal costs are given by TC'(Q) 
= MC(Q). 
Each activity is assumed to operate some- 
where on the economist's standard "U-shaped" 
(quadratic) unit cost function, C(Q).21 The unit 
cost function has a unique minimum at Q*, 
where: C(Q*) = 0. Moreover, since C"(Q) > 0, 
for all Q: at output levels Q < Q*, unit costs 
decrease in Q (i.e. C'(Q) < 0); while at output 
levels Q > Q*, unit costs increase in Q (i.e. 
C'(Q) > 0). Finally, since C'(Q) = (1 / 
Q)[MC(Q)-C(Q)]: marginal cost* are below unit 
costs when Q < Q*; above unit costs when Q > 
Q*; and the same as unit costs when Q = Q*. 
The model focuses on three possibilities. An 
activity can operate: i) on the decreasing por- 
tion of its unit cost function (where Q < Q* and 
MC(Q) < C(Q)); ii) at the minimum point (where 
Q = O* and MC(Q) = C(Q)); or iii) on the increas- 
ing portion of its unit cost function (where Q > 
C/ and MC(Q) > C(Q)). 
The model assumes that cost saving mea- 
sures (i.e. unit-cost reducing investments) un- 
dertaken by an activity in the previous period, 
t-1, result in some quantifiable, permanent re- 
duction in the entire unit-cost function in the 
current period, t, as well as in all subsequent 
periods. In this model, changes in output (or 
sales), Q, result in movements along the unit- 
cost function, C(Q), while (past) investments in 
unit-cost reductions, say /, x, lower the entire 
unit-cost function i.e. cost-reducing invest- 
ments translate into the same unit-cost savings 
for any output level, Q. Thus, the cumulative 
stock of unit-cost savings achieved by t, say K,, 
acts like a shift parameter on the initial unit- 
cost function, C(Q), lowering the entire function 
by the amount Kt, but preserving the minimum 
point at Q*. (also sec Sweeney [1981]) 
Suppose the Comptroller allows activity 
managers to invest, /„ each period in whatever 
alterations to the production process they 
choose in order to generate bonuses through 
gain-sharing and success-sharing.22 Unit-cost 
savings are assumed to occur only after some 
initial investment, 7() > 0, takes place (i.e. the 
initial stock of unit-cost savings is zero, K0 = 0). 
In order to launch cost saving efforts, the 
Comptroller could offer seed money, J(1, at time 
t = 0, and allow the activity to invest what it 
chooses, /„ in each subsequent period. 
According to the DBOF Handbook [1995], 
it is the responsibility of the management of 
each DBOF business area to "Identify and jus- 
tify. . . those improvements which will produce 
future gains in effectiveness and efficien- 
cy."(p.2-9) These improvements (or "cost-re- 
ducing innovations") could be as simple as mi- 
nor workplace modifications that boost morale, 
or as complex as labor-saving (management 
education, worker training, etc.) and /or capi- 
tal-saving (adopting new software or internet 
applications or EOQ inventory policies, etc.) 
technical changes in the existing production 
process. 
It is also stated that capital investments to 
finance these changes must "increase the utility 
of existing assets for more than one accounting 
period, or. . . substantially increase operating 
efficiency over more than one accounting peri- 
od." (DBOF Handbook [1995]p.3-ll)The model 
assumes that investments undertaken by the 
activity in the past period, /, ,, result in some 
permanent, quantifiable operating efficiency, 
/(/, ,), captured as a (lagged) increase in the 
stock of cost savings, Kt - K, ,, that lowers the 
entire unit-cost function for all subsequent pe- 
riods,   (also   see   Sweeney   [1981])   Thus   the 
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change in the stock of unit-cost savings from 
any period t-1 to t is given by: 
Kt - Kt_! =f(It-1)-l where/'(I) > 0. (1) 
Equation (1) represents the evolution of 
unit-cost savings as a function of cost-saving 
investment in the previous period. The model 
assumes that past investment, It_lr translates 
into cost reductions, £(If__a), that add to the (per- 
manent, cumulative) stock of unit-cost savings 
achieved over time i.e. Kt = K(_a + f(It-i)- 
Moreover, with K0 = 0, writing, Kt = 2-ZQ filj), 
reveals that Kt is simply the cumulative stock of 
all unit-cost savings achieved up to time t-1. 
Recent DBOF procedures established for 
capital budgeting (DBOF Handbook [1995]) 
suggest the Comptroller may have some histor- 
ical basis for understanding the process de- 
scribed by (1). Note that Kt consists of a histor- 
ical stream of unit cost savings (i.e. Kt = f(I0) 
+ ... + f(It-\)) made up of individual unit-cost 
"success stories," /(I;), that are (in principle) 
observable. 
The cumulative impact of cost reductions 
on the initial unit cost function, C(Q), is similar 
to that which might result from (and, in fact, 
could originate from) combining a "learning 
curve" with the original unit cost function. The 
cumulative stock of unit-cost savings, Kt, acts 
like a shift parameter on the initial unit-cost 
function, C(Q). For example, the unit cost in 
period t-1, for any output level Q, is given by 
C(Q) — Kt_v However, the investment, It_v 
lowers unit costs in the next period, t, by f(If_a), 
to C(Q) - Kt_, - ifr.J = C(Q) - Kt. In the 
model, cost-reducing investments lower the en- 
tire unit-cost function, but preserve the mini- 
mum point, Q*. A useful avenue for future 
research is to examine the implications of cost- 
reducing investments that shift the minimum 
point, Q* (i.e. that lower the cost function and 
simultaneously: increase the point of minimum 
efficient scale (or "full capacity")—a shift to the 
right; or reduce the point of minimum efficient 
scale (or "full capacity")—a shift to the left). 
It is reasonable to assume that the Comp- 
troller does not know the precise shape of an 
activity's unit cost function. For example, the 
Deputy Comptroller of DoD, Alice Maroni 
[1993], reveals that "In developing the FY1993 
defense budget, DBOF rates were estab- 
lished. .. (and customer accounts were 
sized)... based on the best judgement that 
could be made at that time... [However] [w]e 
have much to learn about the workload, cost, 
and revenue trends being experienced... "(p.4) 
Under such limited (or "asymmetric") in- 
formation it is common for "[p]lanners... [to] 
use recent performance as a... basis for setting 
future indicators." (Weitzman [1976]p.253) 
Thus, an important simplifying assumption is 
that future transfer prices are developed from 
prior year unit cost experience. Given this sce- 
nario, and following Vogelsang & Finsinger 
[1979] and Sappington & Sibley [1988], support 
activities' cost and output data in the model are 
assumed to be revealed to the Comptroller 
(price regulator) with a one-period lag. As a 
consequence, the Comptroller (price regulator) 
sets a stabilized transfer price for each period, 
Pt, partly based on last period's unit costs, 
CiQ^) - Kt_v 
Under current DBOF policy, "[r]ates re- 
main in effect for a fiscal year to be used to bill 
the customer for work or service." (Isosaari 
[1996]p.20) Thus, the Comptroller sets a stabi- 
lized price, Pt, for a support activity's output 
for a given fiscal year, t, and then holds that 
price constant during the year of execution. 
This "stabilized rate" policy was originally de- 
signed "to protect appropriated fund custom- 
ers (operating forces) from unforseen cost 
changes and thereby enable customers to more 
accurately plan and budget for DBOF support 
requirements."(DBOF Handbook [1995]p.3-8) 
However, the fact that transfer prices remain 
unchanged over the fiscal year delivers another 
advantage. This so-called "regulatory lag" 
opens the door for a gain-sharing initiative to 
reward cost savings. According to Rogerson 
[1994]: when the "... regulatory adjustment of 
prices in response to cost reductions... lag[s] 
behind the actual achievement of cost reduc- 
tions [this] creates an incentive for cost-effi- 
ciency." (p.65) 
Since unit cost information in the model is 
revealed to the regulator with a one-period lag, 
the potential exists for a support activity to 
generate a surplus (or "profit") by driving its 
actual unit costs below the stabilized transfer 
price, P„ during the period of regulatory lag. 
According to Laffont & Tirole [1993], Rogerson 
[1994] and others, in situations where the agent 
(the support activity) has better information 
than the principal (the regulator) about costs, it 
will generally be optimal for the principal to 
offer the agent a contract (e.g. gain-sharing) 
that leaves the agent with some economic profit 
(or "surplus"), in order to give the agent an 
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incentive to reduce costs. Thus, combining 
gain-sharing with a "stabilized" unit-cost- 
based pricing policy can encourage the con- 
structive exploitation of regulatory lags. 
According to Rogerson [1994]: "[a] general 
theme of the principal-agent literature is that in 
situations with asvmmctric information, incen- 
tive schemes which cause the agent to reduce 
costs often nccessarilv also leave the agent with 
economic profit. .. This suggests. . . [the] cre- 
ation of cfficicncv incentives. [For example], 
using incentive schemes such as regulatory lag 
that leave profit to the agent may be a particu- 
larlv desirable policv for DoD to consider."p.76 
(also sec Demsetz' [1968], Laffont & Tirole 
[1993], and Riordan [1993]). 
Thus, combining cost-based transfer pric- 
ing and gain-sharing incentives with regulatory 
lags offers one approach to help overcome the 
principal-agent problem. This "incentive 
scheme" rewards extra revenues to support ac- 
tivities who are successful in achieving cost 
savings, i.e. in cutting actual unit costs below 
the previous period's unit costs—or below the 
regulated price, P,. For the remainder of the 
paper, the term "surplus" (as opposed to "prof- 
its") will be used to describe these extra reve- 
nues. The objective is to distinguish earnings 
derived from cost-reducing innovations (i.e. 
"surplus"), from presumably less desirable 
earnings (i.e. "profits") that might be extracted 
from an internal organization's monopoly (or 
market) power, or from some other scheme. 
Gain-sharing initiatives allow an activity to 
retain a fraction (ge[0,l]) of any surplus, say S,, 
earned through unit-cost reductions in a given 
year, t. The activity's gain-sharing bonus (gS,) 
is the fraction of any surplus the support activ- 
ity is entitled to retain, and to distribute inter- 
nally, to reward cost savings. The remainder, 
(1 - g)S„ are actual savings (to DoD) for the 
Fiscal Year. 
The smaller the Comptroller sets the gain- 
sharing parameter, g, the greater the share of 
savings (surplus) that accrues to DoD, but the 
less incentive the support activity has to reduce 
costs and generate those savings. Conversely, 
the larger the Comptroller sets the gain-sharing 
parameter, g, the lower the share of savings 
that accrue to DoD, but the greater the incentive 
the support activity has to reduce costs. 
Consider two extremes. With 100 percent 
gain-sharing (g = 1), the support activity re- 
tains all its cost savings (for employee bonuses, 
etc.), and there is no immediate gain to DoD. 
Alternatively, with no gain-sharing (g = 0), it 
will be demonstrated that there is still no gain 
to DoD in the model, since there is no incentive 
for cost savings to occur over time. In the latter 
case (although monitoring "performance" is 
not formally modeled), if the Comptroller sets 
g = 0 and then attempts to "impose" lower unit 
cost targets (or cut transfer prices unilaterally), 
the Comptroller is likely to incur more burden- 
some monitoring costs to insure forced savings 
arc not achieved at the expense of quality, or 
through "cost-shifting" or through some other 
"creative scheme." 
Brief experiments in DoD with so-called 
"productivity gain-sharing" returned up to 50 
percent (i.e. g = 0.5) of cost savings to the 
activity responsible.2' (sec Alderman [1993], 
Orvis, et.al. [1992], and Shycoff [1992]) How- 
ever, according to the then acting Comptroller: 
"[t]hc remainder of the savings will remain in 
the DBOF or operating budget and will be re- 
flected in tine next fiscal year's unit cost goals 
and price reduction to the customers." (Don 
Shycoff [1992]p.3) Thus, under productivity 
gain-sharing, beating the unit-cost-based price 
target earned support activities a share of cur- 
rent year cost savings, but made the target 
harder to beat in subsequent years. 
In contrast, "success-sharing" shares the 
success of any permanent cost savings between 
customers and the activity responsible for those 
savings. Under success-sharing, while custom- 
ers might still enjoy the benefit of new lower 
prices, the regulator docs not lower prices to 
the full extent of the cost-savings achieved. This 
leaves support activities with future unit-cost 
(price) targets that are easier to beat than they 
might otherwise have been. As a consequence 
success-sharing tends to encourage further cost 
savings. Success-sharing initiatives (represent- 
ed by the parameter, se[0,l]) are designed to 
share the permanent (cumulative) unit-cost 
savings, K,, between customers and the activity 
responsible for those savings. 
The Comptroller is assumed to set (or reg- 
ulate) transfer prices each period, P,, based on 
past (observed) unit-costs, C(Q, ,) - K,_j, 
modified to account for (expected) unit-cost 
savings, f(/, ,), generated from the most recent 
(observed) investment, /, ,, with an allowance 
for success-sharing. Thus the stabilized price an 
activity can charge for each unit of output over 
the period t, is given by, 
P, = C(Q, ,)"(! -s)K.; (2) 
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where: P, consists of the original unit cost func- 
tion, QQJ.J), adjusted for the (cumulative) 
downward shift in unit-cost savings, Kt = K^ + 
f(I,_i), plus whatever allowance is made for suc- 
cess-sharing, sKt. 
The smaller the Comptroller sets the suc- 
cess-sharing parameter, s, the lower the price to 
customers, but the less incentive the support 
activity has to reduce costs. Conversely, the 
larger the Comptroller sets the success-sharing 
parameter, s, the higher the price to customers, 
but the greater the incentive the support activ- 
ity has to reduce costs in subsequent periods. 
Consider two extremes. With 100 percent 
success-sharing (s = 1), regulated transfer 
prices are permanently "stabilized" and never 
reflect any investment in cost savings. In this 
case, the Comptroller shares all subsequent 
(permanent) unit-cost savings with the support 
activity responsible, leaving customers without 
the benefit of lower prices. Alternatively, in the 
usual case of no success-sharing (s = 0), after a 
one-period lag, regulated transfer prices always 
fully reflect any unit-cost savings achieved. 
However, while a small s grants immediate 
benefits (price relief) to customers, the support 
activity does not have as large an incentive to 
invest in cost-reducing innovations, and thus 
long-term savings may be disappointing (i.e. to 
customers, DoD, Congress, or taxpayers). 
The Comptroller's underlying objective in 
the model is to develop an incentive structure 
that motivates activities to invest in cost-reduc- 
ing innovations that lead to permanent cost- 
savings. The Comptroller offers gain-sharing 
(g), success-sharing (s), and regulates unit-cost- 
based transfer prices, Pt, to encourage unit-cost 
reductions over time. In turn, support activities 
seek an investment strategy to reduce their unit 
costs over time, such as to maximize their re- 
turns (or share of the "surplus") from gain- 
sharing and success-sharing programs. The re- 
mainder of this section will focus on a support 
activity's response to the combined incentives 
of the unit-cost-based transfer pricing rule 
(equation (2)), gain-sharing (g), and success- 
sharing (s). 
The last condition imposed on the support 
activity in the model is a requirement to satisfy 
demand at the regulated price. Most regulated 
public utilities face a similar mandate. A sup- 
port activity must produce the quantity of out- 
put demanded by its customers at the unit-cost- 
based regulated transfer price set by the 
Comptroller. Assuming that a customer's de- 
mand for the support activity's output is sensi- 
tive to price, the relationship between the price 
charged and the quantity demanded from the 
activity becomes an important component of 
the analysis. 
The means by which customers justify and 
obtain resources from DBOF activities is 
through DoD's Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS). Once transfer prices 
are established, then customers determine how 
much support they will purchase at those 
prices. Resources required by customers to pur- 
chase business area products are subsequently 
identified in budget request document. "[C]us- 
tomers determine the amount of goods and 
services they expect to purchase... and prepare 
their budget documents based on the projected 
rates and prices for those goods and services." 
(DBOF Handbook [1995])p.3-6) 
Here we are concerned with activities 
whose ("natural" or internal) monopoly posi- 
tion would, in the absence of regulatory over- 
sight (or unit-cost-based transfer pricing), allow 
these activities to independently determine the 
(monopoly) price they could charge customers 
for their product. The study of industrial orga- 
nization suggests that as the product price in- 
creases, less is demanded by customers of firms 
with market power. For example, in the case of 
repairs "[a]s... prices climb, operating unit 
commanders [i.e. customers] who have limited 
funds available may economize and reduce the 
number of units submitted for repair." (Friend 
[1996]p.5) 
Thus, while a support activity must satisfy 
demand at the regulated price, the quantity 
demanded of a support activity's output is gen- 
erally sensitive to that price. The demand func- 
tion that captures this relationship can be writ- 
ten in two different ways: either as, 
Q, = F(Pt); or as, Pt = F~\Qt) = D(Qt);     (3) 
where: D'(Qt) < 0. In the model, it is convenient 
to follow the economist's convention and use 
the latter, "inverse demand function," to repre- 
sent customer demand. In the case where de- 
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mand is set exogenously by policy-makers, and 
is thus insensitive to price, the demand equa- 
tion in (3) is said to be perfectly "inelastic." 
Faced with the Comptroller's binding reg- 
ulator}- pricing constraint (equation (2)), and a 
quadratic unit cost function, say AC(Q) = 
C(Q)-K, a support activity seeks investments in 
cost-reducing innovations (governed by (1)), 
that satisfy customer demands (according to 
(3)) and maximize returns from gain-sharing 
(g) and success-sharing (s). Rewards from gain- 
sharing in any period, t, are given by gS,; where 
S, is the surplus earned during the period of 
regulator}- lag. 
The activity's surplus in the model is the 
difference between its total revenues (price 
times quantity sold) and its total costs (which 
include production and investment related ex- 
penses). Alternatively, the total surplus, S,, con- 
sists of the "profit" generated on each unit sold, 
multiplied by actual sales, minus the total or- 
ganizational costs of current investment. The 
amount of profit generated on each unit sold is 
the difference between the stabilized unit-cost- 
based transfer price, P(, that the activity is al- 
lowed to charge its customers over the period 
of regulatory lag, and the actual (or realized) 
unit cost of producing each unit, C(Q,) — Kt. 
However, multiplying the per-unit-profit, P, — 
[C(Q.) - K,], by actual sales, Q„ yields only part 
of the total surplus, S,. Investments in cost- 
reducing innovations and organizational costs 
associated with those investments need to be 
subtracted out.24 These costs are captured by 
the investment cost function, /((/,), where: h'(.) 
> 0, and h"(.) > 0. 
The support activity can make a surplus or 
deficit or break even over the period of regula- 
tor}- lag, depending on whether or not it covers 
all of its costs when it charges the regulated 
unit-cost-based transfer price, P,. These costs 
include production costs as well as investment 
costs. Thus, the surplus function in any period 
t can be written as: 
S, = P,Q, - [C(Q,) - K,]Q, - h(I,);    (4) 
The first term on the RHS of (4) represents 
earned revenues, or the allowed price times the 
actual quantity sold. The second term on the 
RHS of (4) represents actual total production 
costs, or the actual unit costs incurred (in brack- 
ets) times the quantity sold. The last term, /;(/,), 
is an investment cost function that reflects di- 
minishing returns to cost-reducing invest- 
ments. It is designed to capture the organiza- 
tional (or "total system") cost of adopting new 
technologies (e.g. actual investment costs, to- 
gether with any training costs, morale prob- 
lems, etc.) to reduce its future unit production 
costs. 
In the model, the Comptroller regulates 
transfer prices according to equation (2), and 
offers gain-sharing (g) and success-sharing (s) 
incentive programs that reward cost-reductions 
over time. An activity's rewards from gain- 
sharing is given by gS,; where ge[0,l] reflects 
the share of the surplus, S, (given by equation 
(4)), that the Comptroller decides to reward 
during the period of regulator}' lag. Mean- 
while, an activity's rewards from success-shar- 
ing depend on the new price, P, (given by equa- 
tion (2)), set at the end of each period (or fiscal 
year), where se[0,l] reflects the share of the 
unit-cost savings the Comptroller decides to 
allow the activity to keep in future periods.2"1 
The next section models a support activity's 
response to this incentive structure. 
THE SOLUTION 
The support activity's objective is to choose 
an investment strategy to generate cost-reduc- 
tions over time, that maximizes the discounted 
present value of its gain-sharing and success- 
sharing returns from its future stream of sur- 
pluses, while simultaneously satisfying cus- 
tomer demands. More formally, the activity's 
problem is to maximize, 
W= £{*/(! + r)"}S,; (5) 
where: the surplus at any time, t, is given by, 
S, = P,Q< - [C(Qt) - K,]Q, - Hh);   (4) 
the (inverse) demand the activity must satisfy 
is, 
P, = D(Q,); (3) 
the regulated transfer price charged by the ac- 
tivity and set by the Comptroller is, 
P, = C(Q,-i)-(l-s)Kl; (2) 
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the change in the stock of unit cost savings from 
past investment decisions is, 
Kf-*:,_! =/(/(-i); (i) 
gain-sharing and success-sharing parameters 
set by the Comptroller are, respectively, ge[0,l] 
and se[0,l]; and the rate at which a support 
activity discounts the future is given by, re[0,l]. 
While this problem is too complex to obtain 
a complete analytical solution, useful insights 
can be derived from studying the (long-run) 
stationary equilibrium. To solve for the station- 
ary equilibrium, it is useful to focus on the 
output consequences of an activity's invest- 
ment decisions. 
The connection between an activity's in- 
vestment choices and the resulting output con- 
sequences is intuitive and fairly immediate. 
From equation (1), investment decisions trans- 
late into cost-reductions that are eventually 
captured, in equation (2), as regulated prices. In 
turn, the price charged by an activity impacts 
customers' demands for the output through 
equation (3). As a consequence, any investment 
strategy essentially has an output counterpart. 
While, in principle, either output or investment 
can be used for purposes of obtaining station- 
ary equilibrium results, in practice, solving the 
model in terms of output requires considerably 
less assumptions. In any case, the stationary 
equilibrium is achieved at some stationary 
equilibrium output level, say QE, when no fur- 
ther cost-reducing investment is initiated. 
Given the properties of the objective func- 
tion together with the constraints, the first or- 
der condition requires that, at the optimum, for 
any two periods t and t+1, the increased profit 
from a small increase in output one period 
should be just offset by the discounted loss of 
profit in the subsequent period, or 
dSt/dQt + (1/(1 + r))(dSt+1/dQt) = 0. 26 
(6) 
In order to investigate the implications of 
the first order condition given by (6), the sup- 
port activity's surplus function, St, given by (4), 
must be written exclusively as a function of 
output, i.e. Qt_a, Qt, andQt+1. (see equations 
(4a&b) in Appendix 1) This requires two fur- 
ther simplifying assumptions. First, changes in 
the stock of cost savings are assumed to be a 
fraction (ae[0,l]) of past investment, It_lf or 
Second, the investment cost function in the sur- 
plus equation, (4), is given a functional form 
that reflects diminishing returns to cost-saving 
investments, or 
fc(If) = (l/2)M?; where b>0, 
andh',h">0.    (4') 
Together, these two assumptions yield an 
expression for (6) exclusively in terms of output 
(see Appendix 1), 
B(Q,-i, Qt, Q,+u Qt+i) = 0. (7) 
Kf-Kf.1=/(I(_1) = aI(-1. (1') 
Meanwhile, substituting (3) into (2), and using 
(1'), investment can also be written exclusively 
in terms of output (see Appendix 1), 
It = (l/fl)(l/(l - s)){[C(Qt) - CiQt-i)] 
- [D(Q(+1) - D(Qf)]}.    (8) 
The stationary equilibrium output level is 
given by QE = Qf_a = Qt = Qt+1 = Qt+2- It is 
immediately clear from (8) that, once the sta- 
tionary equilibrium output level, QE, is attained 
no further cost-reducing investment will occur. 
At that point, the marginal (organizational) 
costs of any (further) investment outweighs the 
marginal benefits from gain-sharing and suc- 
cess-sharing. 
At the stationary equilibrium, condition (7) 
can be written more explicitly as, 
B(QE) = [g/(l - s)(l + r)]{s(l + r)[MC(QE) 
-MR(Q£)]-rC'(Q£)Q£} = 0,    (9) 
where: MC(QE) = [C(QE)]+C(QE)QE] are mar- 
ginal production costs (based on the original 
cost function, C(Q)), and MR(QE) = 
[D(QE)+D'(QE)QE] is the marginal revenue 
from sales, QE. 
From (9), as long as an activity is offered 
some amount of gain-sharing and success-shar- 
ing (i.e. with ge(0,l) and se(0,l)), if future re- 
turns are treated the same as immediate returns 
(i.e. with a discount rate, r = 0), the model 
solution is analogous to the usual static optimi- 
zation result for any profit-maximizing firm 
with market power. Notably, the optimal sta- 
tionary equilibrium output level, QE, is attained 
where marginal cost equals marginal revenue 
(i.e. where C(QE) > MC(QE) = MR(QE)). The 
difference from the static result is that, with 
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initial output, Qn< Q*, and with D'(Q) < 
C(Q) < 0, from (2a&b) in Appendix 1, at the 
stationär)- equilibrium, the cumulative stock of 
unit-cost-savings is K > 0. Thus, with r = 0, an 
activity's cost-reducing investments eventually 
drive its actual unit-costs down to AC(Q,) = 
C(Q,)-K; where Q, satisfies MC(Q,:) = MR(Q,•). 
However, under the reasonable behavioral 
assumption that managers of support activities 
pay closer attention to near-term results, a pos- 
itive time rate of discount (r > 0) is more ap- 
propriate. The remaining analysis focuses on 
this scenario. 
Given a positive discount rate, it is useful to 
consider two reference points to help analyze 
the stationary equilibrium. The first reference 
point reflects the possibility the stationary equi- 
librium is at the initial point (Qn, Pf1), where the 
regulator first sets a price at which demand 
intersects the average cost function, or where: 
P° = C(Q°) = D(Q°). The initial price, Pn, is 
assumed to be set at a level such that it just 
covers the activity's initial cost per unit, C(Qn), 
of satisfying the resulting demand (Qn), or Pn = 
C(Q°) = D(Qn). A second useful reference point 
is the minimum of the unit cost function, Q* 
(i.e. where C'(Q*) = 0). From (9), the first ref- 
erence point yields, 
BlQ") = [g/d - s)(l + r)]{s(l + r)[MC(Qn) 
- MR(Q°)] - rC'(Qn)Q0},    (9a) 
while the second reference point yields, 
BlQ*) = [gs/(l - s)]{C(Q*) - MR(Q*)}.       (9/>) 
Note from (9a&b), that gain-sharing is nec- 
essary for activities to invest in cost-reducing 
innovations. With g = 0, the result is always the 
same, i.e. B(Q°) = 0 (and B(Q*) = 0). As a 
consequence, without gain-sharing, the station- 
är)- equilibrium is simply the initial output 
level, Q° (ie. Q, = Qn), and the corresponding 
stationary equilibrium price is simply the initial 
regulated price, Pn = C(Qn) = D(Q"). Moreover, 
from (2a&b) in Appendix 1, K = [l/(l-s)][ 
C(Q°)-D(Q°)] = 0, or in other words, the stock 
of cost savings at the stationary equilibrium is 
zero. The implication is that, without gain-shar- 
ing, it docs not pay to invest in cost-reductions. 
Thus, gain-sharing is required for cost-reducing 
investment to occur in the model. As a conse- 
quence, the analysis that follows assumes some 
degree of gain-sharing, i.e. g > 0. 
From (9a&b) it is possible to narrow the 
analysis of stationary equilibria down to three 
cases. Each case is defined according to where 
an activity first operates on its initial unit cost 
function, C(Q). An activity can operate: (1) on 
the decreasing section of its unit cost function 
(where Q < Q* and C'(Q) < 0); (2) at the 
minimum point (where Q = Q* and C'(Q) = 0); 
or (3) on the increasing section of its unit cost 
function (where Q > Q* and C'(Q) > 0). 
It is an empirical question where an activity 
finds itself on its initial unit cost function. If an 
activity's unit costs decrease with output (or 
"scale"), then it enjoys so-called "economies of 
scale" (see Case (1)). In contrast, if an activity's 
unit costs increase with output (or "scale"), 
then it suffers from "diseconomies of scale" (see 
Case (3)). Strikingly different results are ob- 
tained from gain-sharing in these two cases. A 
summary of the model results (when g > 0 and 
r > 0) is presented below, and in an accompa- 
nying series of graphs. Details of the calcula- 
tions can be found in Appendix 2. 
Case (1): (See Figure 1) 
If an activity initially operates at some 
point, Q° < Q*, on the declining section of its 
unit cost function (where C'(Q) < 0), gain-shar- 
ing alone can motivate the activity to drive its 
costs down over time. The activity benefits by 
investing in cost-reductions, taking advantage 
of the regulatory lag in price adjustments. 
Thus, in the absence of success-sharing (i.e. 
with s = 0), gain-sharing alone can motivate 
activities to invest in cost reductions. The cu- 
mulative stock of cost-savings at the stationär)' 
equilibrium is, K,l0 > 0. These investments 
eventually drive the activity to operate at the 
minimum point, Q, = Q* > Q°, of a lowered 
unit-cost curve, AC(Q) = C(Q)-K. At the sta- 
tionary equilibrium, Q*, the price is given by, 
P,- o = D(Q») = AC(Q*) = MAC(Q*); where: 
MAC(Q) = AC'(Q)Q+AC(Q) = MC(Q)-K, is 
the marginal cost function associated with the 
lowered unit-cost function, AC(Q). 
In this case of decreasing unit costs (or 
"economies of scale"), combining the unit- 
cost-based pricing rule with gain-sharing 
alone, not only motivates activities to in- 
crease efficiencies and drive costs down over 
time, but also encourages production to con- 
Pa$c 36 Military Operations Research, V3 Nl 1997 
GAIN-SHARING, SUCCESS-SHARING AND COST-BASED PRICING 
$ 
P = D(Q°) = C(Q°) 
Ps=o= D(Q*) = 
AC(CT) = MAC(Q*) 
Ps>o 
AC(QE) 
C(Q) 
^^^AC(Q) = C{Q) - Ks=o 
^__^^-^AC(Q) = C(Q) - Ks>o 
^^-       "^"^^ 
D(Q) 
QE Workload 
(Quantity of 
Output/Period) 
Figure 1. 
verge to the economist's "full capacity" (or 
"minimum efficient scale"), where unit cost 
equals marginal cost. Thus, an additional ad- 
vantage of combining the regulator's pricing 
rule (equation (2)) with gain-sharing (g > 0) 
is that unit-cost-based prices tend to automat- 
ically converge to preferred marginal-cost- 
based prices. 
Nevertheless, any degree of success-shar- 
ing can promote even further cost-savings, i.e. 
at the new stationary equilibrium with s = 0, 
QE > Q* > Q°, and Ks>0> Ks=0 > 0. It is useful 
to examine the impact of adding a success- 
sharing program from both sides of the organi- 
zation—from the perspective of (internal) "cus- 
tomers," and from the perspective of (internal) 
"support activities." 
From the point of view of customers, al- 
though unit costs are lower than they would 
be under gain-sharing alone, the price they 
pay is greater than actual unit costs, i.e. Ps > 0 
= D(QE) > AC(QE). However, from the ac- 
tivity's viewpoint, this price-cost difference 
can be thought of as the necessary (discount- 
ed stream of) rewards that motivates the 
search for further cost-savings. Regardless, 
customers still benefit from this new budget- 
ing approach. They have more product avail- 
able at the stationary equilibrium (i.e. QE > 
Q*),   and  are  charged  a  lower  price  (i.e. 
AC(QE)  <  Ps>0  <  Ps=0  =  AC(Q*)),  than 
under gain-sharing alone. 
Case (2): (See Figure 2) 
If an activity operates at the minimum 
point, i.e. Q° = Q*, where C'(Q) = 0, gain- 
sharing alone will not have an impact. At the 
stationary equilibrium, QE = Q° = Q*, and Ps=0 
= C(Q°) = D(Q°), so that the stock of cost- 
savings is, K = 0. In this case success-sharing is 
required to motivate an activity to invest in 
cost-reductions. 
Combining gain-sharing with success-shar- 
ing can promote cost-savings. Similar to Case 
(1), from the customer's viewpoint, although 
unit costs are lower at the new stationary equi- 
librium (QE > Qo = Q*) than under gain-shar- 
ing alone, the customer pays more than actual 
unit costs, i.e. Ps>0 = D(QE) > AC(QE). How- 
ever, from the support activity's viewpoint, this 
price-cost difference can be thought of as the 
necessary (discounted stream of) rewards that 
motivates the search for cost-savings. Regard- 
less, customers still benefit from the new bud- 
geting approach. At the stationary equilibrium, 
customers have more product available, QE > 
Q*, and pay less for it (i.e. AC(QE) < Ps>0 < 
Ps=0 = C(Q*)). 
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Ps.5=P = D(Qu) 
C(Q°) 
AC(Q) = C(Q) - Ks>o 
Q*      QE Workload 
(Quantity of 
Output/Period) 
Figure 2. 
Case (3): (See Figure 3) 
Finally, if an activity initially operates at 
some point, Qn > Q*, on the increasing section 
of its unit cost function (where C'(Q) > 0), even 
if gain-sharing is substantial (i.e. g—>1), the 
threat of a subsequent collapse in the price (to 
the new, lower unit costs) wipes out the activ- 
ity's incentive to invest in cost-savings, (see 
Figure 4) 
In fact, with gain-sharing alone, the only 
(notional) stationary equilibrium is one where 
K < 0. However, a negative stock of cost sav- 
ings corresponds to an increase in unit-costs! 
$ 
AC(Q) = C(Q) - K: (K< 0) 
'""        C(Q) 
P = D(Q°) = C(Q°) ^\   r\x ^AC(Q) = C(Q) - K: (K > 0) 
P^ 
AC(QE) 
^■"--———-"i 
1              i 
j               : 
I               i 
1               1 
D(Q) 
Q°    QE Workload 
(Quantity of 
Output/Period) 
Figure 3. 
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Since the cumulative stock of cost savings is 
constrained to be non-negative in the model 
(i.e. cost-saving investment can only reduce 
unit-costs), gain-sharing alone does not yield a 
stationary equilibrium. In order to invest in 
cost-reductions, activities require a minimum 
amount of success-sharing. 
The intuition for the results obtained in this 
case (when g > 0 and s = 0) can be seen using 
a simple example. Figure 4 illustrates a case 
where gain-sharing is not sufficient to induce 
an activity to invest in cost-reductions. If the 
activity produced 200 units last period (point 
A) at a unit cost of $5/unit, suppose this is the 
price the regulator allows it to charge its cus- 
tomers during the current period. 
Suppose cost-saving efforts drive the unit 
cost function in the current period from C(Q) to 
AC(Q). Then the unit cost of production is 
driven down to $3/unit at point B. This would 
generate a maximum surplus during the period 
of regulatory lag equal to $2/unit, or a total of 
$400. If there is 50% gain-sharing (i.e. g = .5), 
then the maximum corresponding gain-sharing 
bonus is $200, to be distributed to the employ- 
ees at the end of the current period. 
However, now suppose the regulated price 
the activity can charge in the next period drops 
to the new unit cost level, or $3/unit. Since the 
quantity demanded by customers is sensitive to 
the price, this new, lower price generates more 
demand (250 units) by customers (point C). 
This increase in quantity demanded implies 
that production costs per unit for the activity 
will rise to $6/unit (point D), creating a $3 loss 
on each unit sold (or a $750 loss). 
This means the activity manager faces a 
decision as to whether a $200 bonus today is 
worth bearing a $750 loss next period. To make 
the investment in cost-savings worthwhile to 
the activity, the discount rate would have to be 
an unrealistically high 275% (i.e. 200>[1/ 
(l+r)]750 => r>2.75). Even with 100% gain- 
sharing (i.e. with g = 1, such that the gain- 
sharing bonus equals the total surplus of $400), 
the discount rate applied would have to be over 
85% (i.e. r>.875). This simple illustration sug- 
gests that, while gain-sharing can be demon- 
strated to be effective where there are econo- 
mies of scale, it may not be effective when there 
are diseconomies of scale. 
Worse yet, with diseconomies of scale it is 
possible activities might have a perverse incen- 
tive to increase their unit cost function. If a 
zero-profit policy is pursued (where surpluses 
are used as bonuses, and losses are recouped by 
$ 
6 
5 
C(Q) 
'         AC(Q) 
     -JÜS^^A                    / 
D 
—-*^^"^                B C 
D(Q) 
Qo = 200 
Figure 4. 
Qi = 250 Workload 
(Quantity of 
Output/Period) 
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adjusting future target prices), future target 
prices would reflect past losses. This means that 
the subsequent period target price would be the 
summation of the S6 unit cost and an adjust- 
ment factor to recoup the $750 total loss. This 
higher price would decrease the quantity de- 
manded by the customer to a level perhaps 
even below the initial level of 200 units (i.e. to 
some quantity to the left of point A). A pricing 
system of this sort might cither lead to instabil- 
ity, or perhaps as described in Appendix 2, to a 
stationary equilibrium at the minimum point, 
Q*, on a higher unit cost curve, AC(Q) = 
C(Q) - K, where K < 0. This suggests that if 
gain-sharing is offered by itself, current DBOF 
pricing policy may need to be re-evaluated for 
those activities that operate under "disecono- 
mies of scale" or "decreasing returns to scale." 
One way to overcome this problem, and to 
induce managers to undertake cost-saving 
measures, is to prevent next period's target 
price from falling all the way to the new lower 
unit cost of production. This is precisely the 
concept behind "success-sharing." In the case 
of diseconomies of scale, although gain-sharing 
is necessary to motivate cost-savings over time, 
if offered by itself it can be counterproductive. 
A minimum level, s[r/(l+r)], of success-shar- 
ing is required to attain a stationary equilib- 
rium (i.e. Q, < Q° < Q*), where the stock of 
cost savings is, Ks.n > 0. 
From the viewpoint of (internal) customers, 
although stationary equilibrium unit-costs are 
lower than starting'unit-costs, AC(Q,) < C(Qn), 
customers pav more than the new unit-costs, 
i.e. Pf .0 = D(Q,) > AC(Q,). However, from the 
activity's viewpoint, this price-cost difference 
can be thought of as the necessary (discounted 
stream of) rewards that motivates the search for 
cost-savings. Regardless, the final outcome un- 
der a combination of gain-sharing and success- 
sharing is favorable to the customer. More of 
the product or service is available, Q, > Q", at 
a lower price than the starting price, i.e. 
AC(Q,)<Ps_0<P = C(Qn). 
CONCLUSION 
This paper offers a new budgeting ap- 
proach for the Department of Defense. The pa- 
per models an incentive structure for govern- 
ment activities that rewards cost-savings and 
efficiencies. The model combines cost-based- 
pricing with the popular business practice of 
gain-sharing, and a new incentive program 
called success-sharing. The dual objective of the 
paper was: first, to offer a framework to help 
upper-level management evaluate organiza- 
tional incentives in cost-based pricing systems; 
and second, to persuade the Operations Re- 
search community to join in this effort to model 
critical budgeting issues. 
The goal of gain-sharing is to encourage 
activities to make an effort to reduce their cur- 
rent costs in return for some of the immediate 
gains from the cost savings. Success-sharing 
refers to the degree to which any "permanent" 
success in obtaining cost-savings is shared be- 
tween customers and the activity responsible 
for the savings. While success-sharing allows 
customers to benefit from cost reductions, it 
also rewards support activities with part of the 
future stream of benefits from their cost-reduc- 
ing innovations. 
Many large, complex, vertically-integrated 
organizations include separate activities that 
conduct internal exchanges of goods and ser- 
vices. The challenge faced by these organiza- 
tions is to govern the relationships among in- 
ternal activities to promote the goals of the 
organization as a whole. Many private firms 
solve this problem through the use of internal 
cost-based transfer prices. 
This paper applies lessons from the transfer 
pricing literature to a unique subset of govern- 
ment activities—those that "earn" their bud- 
gets. Internal DoD support activities financed 
through DBOF offer an illustration. DBOF ac- 
tivities sell their goods and services to "custom- 
ers" (operating forces) at regulated cost-based 
transfer prices. The primary difference between 
DBOF business areas and private firms is that, 
by Congressional statute, DBOF activities must 
operate on a cumulative, non-profit basis. A 
critical challenge is to align agent's (or support 
activities') incentives, with the objective (e.g. 
cost-reduction) of the "principal" (or Comptrol- 
ler). 
This paper offers a new budgeting ap- 
proach that encourages support activities to 
lower costs by offering the opportunity to re- 
ward employees for cost-reducing innovations. 
Economist's have discovered that, both with 
defense firms and with electricity generating 
companies, regulatory adjustments of prices in 
response to cost reductions tend to lag behind 
the actual achievement of cost reductions, and 
that this can create an incentive for cost-effi- 
ciency. This concept of so-called "regulator}' 
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lag" is applied here to the regulation of internal 
"support activities." 
In the model, the "principal" (i.e. the 
Comptroller) offers gain-sharing and success- 
sharing programs, and regulates unit-cost- 
based transfer prices with a lag, to reward unit- 
cost reductions over time. Meanwhile, the 
"agents" (i.e. support activities) seek invest- 
ment strategies in unit-cost reducing innova- 
tions that maximize the discounted present 
value of their rewards from gain-sharing and 
success-sharing, while simultaneously satisfy- 
ing customer demands. 
One extension of the model would be to 
develop an explicit game between the principal 
and the agent(s). In this game, one player, the 
principal (or Comptroller), chooses a pricing 
rule, the optimal period of regulatory lag, and 
gain-sharing and success-sharing programs, to 
maximize (the discounted present value of) to- 
tal cost savings over time. Meanwhile, the other 
player, the agent (or support activity), would 
operate much as modeled here. The agent 
would take the pricing rule and regulatory lag 
as given, and would invest in cost-reductions to 
maximize the discounted present value of re- 
turns from gain-sharing and success-sharing 
programs, while satisfying customer demands. 
This new budgeting approach, with its 
"built-in" incentive structure, rewards a share 
of revenues to activities who are successful in 
achieving costs savings over time. A recent 
Congressionally-mandated study emphasizes 
that: "[a] powerful incentive in the DoD would 
be to give Service Secretaries and heads of de- 
fense agencies the authority to retain in their 
future "top line" planning a substantial portion 
of any savings [or "surplus"] that can be gen- 
erated in their department or agency" (DD 
[1995]p.4-16) This policy could ultimately en- 
courage the implementation of gain-sharing 
and success-sharing programs at lower levels in 
the organization. 
The results of the model indicate that when 
support activities can invest in one period to 
lower their unit costs in a subsequent period, 
gain-sharing is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition to create the incentives for them to do 
so. Success-sharing may be required to aug- 
ment gain-sharing in order to encourage cost 
reductions over time. 
Three important results are obtained in the 
model. Each result depends on where an activ- 
ity first operates on its initial unit cost function. 
An activity can operate: (1) on the decreasing 
section of its unit cost function; (2) at the min- 
imum point; or (3) on the increasing section of 
its unit cost function. 
It is largely an empirical question where an 
activity finds itself on its initial unit cost func- 
tion. If an activity's unit costs decrease with 
output (or "scale"), then it enjoys so-called 
"economies of scale" (Case (1)). In contrast, if 
an activity's unit costs increase with output (or 
"scale"), then it suffers from "diseconomies of 
scale" (Case (3)). Strikingly different results are 
obtained from gain-sharing in these two cases. 
Given the current defense environment, a 
support activity may face a number of scenar- 
ios. Among these is: a) a cut in the demand for 
its product; b) increased competition from in- 
ternal (or external) suppliers of a similar prod- 
uct; or c) an increase in demand for its product 
(say due to consolidation). 
If an activity suffers significant cuts in de- 
mand for its output, it is more likely to fall 
under Case (1). The greater the actual (or threat 
of) competition, the more likely it is an activity 
operates at minimum unit cost, Case (2). Fi- 
nally, if an activity experiences an increase in 
demand for its output, say due to consolida- 
tion, it is more likely to fall under Case 3. 
Regardless, in the absence of gain-sharing (i.e. 
with g = 0), it makes no difference where an 
activity operates on its initial unit cost function. 
There is no incentive for cost-savings in the 
model without some degree of gain-sharing.27 
In each case reviewed below, results are re- 
ported for gain-sharing alone, and then for a 
combination of gain-sharing and success-shar- 
ing. 
Case (1): If an activity initially operates 
with decreasing unit costs, gain-sharing alone, 
combined with the regulated unit-cost-based 
transfer pricing rule, not only encourages activ- 
ities to reduce costs over time, but also eventu- 
ally results in marginal cost pricing. The activ- 
ity benefits by investing in cost-reductions, 
because it can take advantage of the regulatory 
lag in price adjustments. In this case of decreas- 
ing unit costs (or "economies of scale"), com- 
bining the unit-cost-based pricing rule with 
gain-sharing alone, not only motivates activi- 
ties to increase efficiencies and drive costs 
down over time, but also encourages produc- 
tion to converge to the economist's "full capac- 
ity" (or "minimum efficient scale"), where unit 
cost equals marginal cost. Thus, an additional 
advantage of combining the regulator's pricing 
rule with gain-sharing is that unit-cost-based 
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prices tend to automatically converge to pre- 
ferred marginal-cost-based prices. 
Nevertheless, any degree of success-shar- 
ing can promote even further cost-savings. 
From the point of view of customers, although 
unit costs are lower than they would be under 
gain-sharing alone, the price they pay is greater 
than actual unit costs. However, from the activ- 
itv's viewpoint, this price-cost difference can be 
thought of as the necessary (discounted stream 
of) rewards that motivates the search for fur- 
ther cost-savings. Regardless, customers still 
benefit from this new budgeting approach. 
Thev have more product available and pay a 
lower price than they would under gain-shar- 
ing alone. An extension of the analysis might 
investigate whether offering gain-sharing alone 
leads to a bias in the composition of invest- 
ment—favoring immediate (but more "tran- 
sient") cost-savings, at the expense of future 
(but more "permanent") savings that are re- 
warded under a success-sharing program. 
Case (2): If an activity operates at minimum 
unit costs, gain-sharing alone will not have an 
impact. However, combining gain-sharing with 
success-sharing can promote cost-savings. 
From the customer's viewpoint, although unit 
costs are lower at the new stationary equilib- 
rium than under gain-sharing alone, the cus- 
tomer pays more than the actual unit costs. 
However, from the support activity's view- 
point, this price-cost difference can be thought 
of as the necessary (discounted stream of) re- 
wards that motivates a search for cost-savings. 
Regardless, customers still benefit from the 
new budgeting approach. At the stationary 
equilibrium, customers have more product 
available and pay less for it. 
Case (3): With increasing unit costs, even if 
gain-sharing is substantial, the threat of a sub- 
sequent collapse in the price (to the new, lower 
unit costs) wipes out the activity's incentive to 
invest in cost-savings. Gain-sharing alone does 
not yield a stationär}' equilibrium. In fact, in the 
case of "diseconomies of scale," offering gain- 
sharing by itself can be counterproductive. 
In order to invest in cost-reductions, activ- 
ities require a minimum amount of success- 
sharing. From the viewpoint of (internal) cus- 
tomers, although unit-costs with success- 
sharing arc lower than starting unit-costs, 
customers pay more than the actual unit-costs. 
However, from the activity's viewpoint, this 
price-cost difference can be thought of as the 
ncccssarv (discounted stream of) rewards that 
motivates a search for cost-savings. Regardless, 
customers still benefit from the new budgeting 
approach. A combination of gain-sharing and 
success-sharing results in more of the product 
or service being made available, at a lower 
price to the customer. 
Although combining gain-sharing and suc- 
cess-sharing with unit-cost-based pricing ap- 
pears to offer an attractive alternative to con- 
ventional public budgeting, the manner in 
which such a system is implemented is critical 
to its success. A number of concerns remain to 
be addressed. 
First, the model is silent about the depreci- 
ation of capital (either due to "wear & tear" or 
due to obsolescence). Adding depreciation 
would be a useful extension that would result 
in a steady state (investment plan), as opposed 
to the stationary state (in which there is no 
further investment) in the model. Another in- 
teresting opportunity to extend the model is to 
recognize that inaccurate forecasts of customer 
demands can impact other activities. The role of 
substitutes and complements and uncertainty 
in demand might be captured in a stochastic 
demand function. Other extensions could ex- 
amine the impact of variable returns from cost- 
reducing investments, and explore the conse- 
quences of varying gain-sharing and success- 
sharing parameters over time. 
A second concern is that the proposed bud- 
geting system can only operate where organi- 
zational outputs, inputs, and customers are 
well defined. Moreover, a financial manage- 
ment accounting system is required that reveals 
all labor, materials and capital costs that con- 
tribute to each output at as disaggregated a 
level as possible. In the case of multiple out- 
puts, any "common" or "joint" costs must be 
carefully allocated for the system to succeed in 
lowering overall costs. Moreover, in imple- 
menting this system, unit costs must include 
the (allocated) costs of the financial manage- 
ment accounting system itself, together with 
any required monitoring costs. 
Third, to retain proper organizational in- 
centives, the financial accounting system must 
be capable of separating exogenous cost 
changes from an activity's endogenous cost- 
savings. If exogenous (input) cost increases 
camouflage an activity's endogenous cost-sav- 
ings, then incentives may not be awarded when 
they are in fact deserved. Conversely, if exoge- 
nous (input) cost decreases camouflage an ac- 
tivity's endogenous cost increases, then incen- 
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tives will be awarded when they are not 
deserved. Further complicating the problem is 
the fact external (or exogenous) costs are not 
constant over time. Introducing a stochastic 
unit cost function in the model could offer fur- 
ther insights. 
Fourth, cost savings can clearly be gener- 
ated by reducing quality. Thus, there may be 
burdensome monitoring costs (as well as some 
additional accounting costs) in insuring that 
claimed cost savings are not achieved at the 
expense of quality, effectiveness, or through 
"cost shifting," or through some other creative 
"rent-seeking" schemes. To avoid these prob- 
lems, the threat of outsourcing, competition, or 
the explicit regulation and monitoring of per- 
formance, continue to be essential to safeguard 
quality and effectiveness. 
Fifth, the incentive problem must be bro- 
ken into two parts: i) the "external" incentives 
provided to the activity (through gain-sharing 
and success-sharing) to motivate cost savings, 
and ii) the internal distribution of those incen- 
tives to motivate management and workers. 
The important question of the distribution of 
internal incentives remains an issue for further 
study (see footnote 27). 
Finally, the success of gain-sharing and 
success-sharing programs depends on public 
organizations benefiting from their cost-sav- 
ings. Earning profits in the public sector is a 
sensitive and controversial issue. However, it 
may be useful to educate the public of the im- 
portant role profits can play in motivating cost- 
savings. A few precedents could make this job 
easier. These include beneficial suggestion pro- 
grams that offer both lump-sum (gain-sharing 
type) returns, and more permanent (success- 
sharing type) returns based on the savings en- 
joyed by an organization over time. Compari- 
sons can also be drawn between employee 
compensation plans that offer productivity re- 
wards as one-time ("lump-sum" or "annual") 
bonuses (similar to gain-sharing), as opposed to 
"step" or "merit" increases—which are perma- 
nent increases in salary (similar to success-shar- 
ing). Moreover, it may prove useful to use the 
term "surplus" instead of "profits." The term 
surplus can be used to distinguish earnings 
derived from cost-reducing innovations, from 
the presumably less desirable earnings (i.e. 
profits) that might be extracted from an activi- 
ty's internal market power. 
Increasing cost awareness and instilling 
business practices in public activities is an im- 
portant first step. The next step is to grant 
activity managers the financial authority and 
flexibility to invest in manpower, equipment, 
and other resources to improve quality and 
lower costs, and to reward them for doing so. 
In the private sector, savings result in in- 
creased profits or improved effectiveness— 
metrics for which managers are rewarded. In 
contrast, "[i]n the Federal sector... most re- 
wards are for strict compliance with rules... 
[Thus], better organizational incentives are 
needed." (DD [1995]p.4-17) This paper offers a 
new budgeting approach with a "built-in" set 
of organizational incentives. The main conclu- 
sion is that, although customers still have to 
monitor quality, combining "gain-sharing" and 
"success-sharing" with a cost-based pricing 
system can motivate substantial cost-savings 
over time. Moreover, these results are not 
unique to Defense. The model applies to any 
regulated activities subject to unit-cost-based 
pricing. 
APPENDIX 1 
If a support activity is required to satisfy 
demand at the regulated price, then (3) can be 
substituted into (2) yielding expressions for this 
and next periods stock of cost savings in terms 
of output. These are respectively, 
Kt = (1 / (1 - s))[C(Qt_1) - D(Q()], (2a) 
and 
Kt = (1 / (1 - s))[C(Qt) - D(Qf+1)]. (2b) 
Substituting (2a&b) into (1') yields an expres- 
sion for investment, It, in terms of output that 
can be given by (4), where h(If) = (1 / 2)bl2t. As a 
result of this and (1'), (2), (2a&b), and (3), sur- 
plus functions at t and t+1 can be written in 
terms of Q as follows: 
St = D(Qt)Qt-Qt{C(Qt)~ (1/(1 -s)) 
•[C(Qf_1)-D(Qf)]}-Zt(4fl) 
and 
Sf+1 = D(Qi+1)Qt+1 - QM{C(QM) - 
(1 / (1 - s))[C(Q() - D(Qt+1]} - Zt+1,    (4b) 
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where: 
Z. = (/'/2(72)(Kr., - 2K,K,., + K?), 
and 
Z.., = (l>/2fl2)(K?1,-2K..1K(.2 + K?,,), 
are functions of Q, ,, Q„ wirf Q,,,, asa result of 
(2a&b). Using (4a&b) the condition given by (6) 
can now be expressed exclusively as a function 
of output, or as, 
B(Q: ,,Q,,Q,.wQ,.:) = 0. (7) 
APPENDIX 2 
Given the initial price, Pn = C(Qn) = D(Qn), 
from (9a): with a success-sharing program (i.e. 
s > 0), 
B(Qn) > or < 0, as s(l + r)[C'(Qn) - D'(Q0)] 
- rC'(Qn)} >or£0;    (9a') 
In the absence of success-sharing (i.e. s = 0), 
this condition reduces to, 
B(Q") > or < 0, as -rC'(Qn)| > or < 0. 
(9a") 
Meanwhile, from (9b): with s > 0, 
B(Q*) > or ^ 0, as{C(Q*) - MR(Q*)} 
>or<0,    (9b') 
where, MR(Q*) = D'(Q*)Q* + D(Q*); while with 
s = 0, the condition reduces to, 
B(Q*) = 0. (9b") 
The three cases analyzed below are distin- 
guished by the location of the initial output 
level, Qn, relative to the minimum of the initial 
unit-cost function, Q*: Case (1) examines Q° < 
Q*; Case (2) examines Qn = Q*; and Case (3) 
examines Q° > Q*. In each case, the initial price 
is set where P° = C(Q°) = D(Qn). 
Case 1 (Q° < Q*): 
Suppose an activity operates on the declin- 
ing portion of its unit cost function at some 
initial production level, Q° < Q*, where Pn = 
C(Q°) = D(Q°), and that for any output level, 0° 
<Q<: Q*, D'(Q)<C'(Q) < 0. Two possible suc- 
cess-sharing scenarios need to be examined. 
Case (la): If s = 0, then it is immediate from 
(9a") and (9b") respectively that: B(Qn) > 0 and 
B(Q*) = 0. Thus, with no success-sharing, the 
stationary equilibrium is given by Q, = Q* > 
Qn. Moreover, the fact that at Qn, C(Q°) = 
D(Q°), combined with a monotonic decreasing 
(inverse) demand function and 
D'(Q)<C'(Q)<0,       Qn<Q<Q*,   implies   that, 
C(Q)>D(Q),      Qn<Q<Q*. As a consequence, 
associated with the stationär)' equilibrium, Qt 
= Q*, there is a positive stock of cost-savings, 
K, „ (i.e. from (2a&b) in Appendix 1, K.=0 = 
[C(Q*) -D(Q*)]>0). 
This indicates that gain-sharing alone (i.e. 
g>0 and s = 0) is sufficient for cost-reducing 
investments to take place. The stationär}' equi- 
librium at Qi = Q*>Q° on the new lower av- 
erage total cost curve, AC(Q) = C(Q)-K.^0, is 
illustrated in Figure 1. Expressing the regulated 
price as P = AC(Q)+sK, reveals a stationär)' 
equilibrium price, P,= n = D{Q*) = AC(Q*). 
It is useful to define the marginal cost func- 
tion associated with the new lower unit cost 
curve, AC(Q), as, MAC(Q) = d[AC(Q)Q]/dQ = 
AC(Q)+AC'(Q)Q. Since, at Q, = Q*, AC'(Q*) = 
0, the regulated price at the stationär)' equilib- 
rium is set equal to marginal costs, (i.e. since 
MAC(Q*) = AC(Q*)). In this case, gain-sharing 
combined with a unit-cost-bascd transfer pric- 
ing rule not only encourages activities to reduce 
costs over time (i.e. K > 0), but, in the limit, also 
eventually results in marginal cost pricing of 
the output (i.e. P,_0 = MAC = AC). 
Case (lb): If s > 0, since D'(Q)<C'(Q)<0, 
Q°<Q<Q*, from (9a'), B(Qn)>0. However, 
since C(Q) > D(Q), Qn>Q<Q*, from (9b'), it is 
also the case that B(Q*) > 0. This implies that 
neither Qn nor Q* are a stationary equilibrium. 
Thus, if it exists, the stationary equilibrium is at 
some output level, Q,:, beyond Q*, such that QE 
> Q* > Q°- While gain-sharing alone is suffi- 
cient to encourage cost-savings, combining 
gain-sharing with success-sharing (i.e. g > 0 
and s > 0) motivates further cost-reducing in- 
vestment i.e. the stock of cost-savings with suc- 
cess-sharing is K^.0 = [l/(l-s)][C(Q,) -D(Qr)} 
> K^-0, (i.e. the spread between C(Q) and D(Q) 
at Q, is larger than at Q* and 0<s<l implies 
[l/(l-s)]>l). Moreover, the stationär)' equilib- 
rium price is Po„0 = D(Q,.:) = AC(QF) +sK 
>AC(Q,). Thus, in the model, further cost sav- 
ings can be achieved if customers are willing to 
pay prices above unit costs at the stationär)' 
equilibrium. Finally, although marginal pro- 
duction costs at Qf are greater than unit costs, 
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MAC(Q£) > AC(QE), the price, Ps>a may or 
may not cover marginal costs, partly depend- 
ing on the magnitude of success-sharing, sK 
(i.e. if success-sharing is sufficiently large, Ps>0 
>MAC(Q£) > AC(QE)). 
Case 2 (Q° = Q*): 
Suppose an activity operates at the mini- 
mum of its unit cost function at some initial 
production level, Q° = Q*, where P° = C(Q°) = 
D(Q°), and D'(Q°) < C'(Q°) = 0. Two possible 
success-sharing scenarios need to be examined. 
Case (2a): If s = 0 and Q° = Q*, then it is 
immediate from (9a") and (9b") respectively 
that: B(Q°) = 0 and B(Q») = 0. Thus, with no 
success-sharing, the stationary equilibrium is 
given by QE = Q° = Q*. As a consequence, 
while there is marginal cost pricing at the sta- 
tionary equilibrium (i.e. P° = MC(Q°) = C(Q0)), 
since Ks=? = [C(Q°)-D(Q0)] = 0, even with a 
gain-sharing program (i.e. g > 0), if an activity 
currently operates at minimum unit costs, in 
the absence of a success-sharing program (i.e. 
with s = 0) there is no incentive in the model 
for investments in cost-reductions over time. 
Case (2b): If s > 0 and Q° = Q*, since D'(Q°) 
< C'(Q°) = 0, and P° = C(Qb) = D(Q°) > 
MR(Q°), then from (9a'), B(QÖ) > 0, and from 
(9b'), it is also the case that B(Q*) > 0. This 
implies that neither Q° = Q* nor Q < Q* is a 
stationary equilibrium. Thus, if it exists, the 
stationary equilibrium is at some output level, 
QE, beyond Q*, such that QE> Q° = Q*. Since 
the stock of cost savings at this point is, Ks>0 = 
[l/(l-s)][C(Q£)-D(Q£)] > KS=Q = 0, combining 
gain-sharing with success-sharing (i.e. g > 0 
and s > 0) is required to motivate cost-reducing 
investment. Moreover, the stationary equilib- 
rium price is Ps>0 = D(QE) = AC(Q£) +sK > 
AC(QE). Thus, in the model, cost savings are 
achieved only if customers are willing to pay 
prices above unit costs at the stationary equi- 
librium. Finally, although marginal production 
costs at QE are greater than unit costs, 
MAC(QE) > AC(QE, the price, Ps>0, may or 
may not cover marginal costs partly depending 
on the magnitude of success-sharing, sK (i.e. if 
success-sharing is sufficiently large, Ps>0 
>MAC(QE) > AC(QE)). 
Case 3 (Q° > Q*): 
Suppose an activity operates on the increas- 
ing portion of its unit cost function at some 
initial production level, Q° > Q*, where P° = 
C(Q°) = D(0°), and that for any output level, 
Q* ^Qs Qb, C'(Q) > 0 > D'(Q). Two possible 
success-sharing scenarios need to be examined. 
Case (3a): If s = 0, then it is immediate from 
(9a") and (9b") respectively that: B(Q°)<0 and B 
(Q*) = 0- Thus, with no success-sharing, if it 
exists, the stationary equilibrium is given by QE 
= Q* < Q°. However, the fact that at Q°, C(Q°) 
= D(Q°), combined with a monotonic decreas- 
ing (inverse) demand function and C'(Q)>0 > 
D'(Q). Q* <Q< Q°, implies that, C(Q)<D(Q), 
Q* < Q < Q°. As a consequence, associated 
with the stationary equilibrium, QE = Q*, there 
is a negative stock of cost-savings, i.e. K5=0 = 
[C(Q») -D(Q»)]<0. However, this implies the 
activity will invest to pad (or increase) its costs, 
and only cost-reducing investments are al- 
lowed in the model. So QE = Q* cannot be a 
stationary equilibrium. It is demonstrated in 
(3b) below that a minimum degree of success- 
sharing is required when an activity operates 
with unit production costs that increase with 
workload. Moreover, if a regulator has a pric- 
ing rule that compensates activities for cost in- 
creases, surplus-maximizing activities may 
have an incentive to make spurious "invest- 
ments" when they operate under increasing 
unit cost conditions. 
Case (3b): If s > 0, since C'(Q)>0 > D'(Q), 
Q* ^Q^ Q°, from (9a'), if 0 > s > [r/(l+r)], 
then B(Q°) > 0. Meanwhile, since C(Q)<D(Q), 
Q* <Q < Q°, if the demand curve is suffi- 
ciently inelastic (i.e. customers are relatively 
insensitive to price), then C(Q*) > MR(Q*), and 
from (9b'), it is also the case that B(Q*) > 0. 
Marginal revenue at Q*, MR(Q*), can be written 
in terms of the price elasticity of demand (EQ P 
= (% AQ/ % AP) = (D'Q/D)<0): MR(Q*) = 
D'(Q*)Q* +D(Q*) = D(Q*)[(l/EaP)+l], where 
inelastic demand is given by |EQ J < 1. If these 
conditions hold, then neither Q nor Q* (nor 
any other arbitrary reference point, Q* < Q < 
Q°) are a stationary equilibrium. Thus, if it ex- 
ists, the stationary equilibrium is at some out- 
put level, Q£, beyond Q*, such that QE> Q° > 
Q*. Since the stock of cost savings at this point 
is, Ks>0 = [l/(l-s)][C(QE)-D(QE)] > 0, combin- 
ing gain-sharing with a minimum level of suc- 
cess-sharing (i.e. g > 0 and s > [r/(l+r)]) is 
required to motivate cost-reducing investment. 
Moreover, the stationary equilibrium price is 
Ps>o = D(QE) = AC(QE) +sK > AC(QE). Thus, 
in the model, cost savings are achieved only if 
customers are willing to pay prices above unit 
costs at the stationary equilibrium. Finally, al- 
though marginal production costs at QE are 
greater than unit costs, MAC(QE) > AC(QE), 
the price, Ps > 0, may or may not cover marginal 
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costs partly depending on the magnitude of 
success-sharing, sK (i.e. if success-sharing is 
sufficiently large, P, -„ n > MAC(Q;;) > AC(Q,:)). 
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ENDNOTES 
1
 See, for example, W. Rogerson's paper enti- 
tled "On the Use of Transfer Prices Within 
DoD: The Case of Repair and Maintenance of 
Depot-Level Reparables by the Air Force," Lo- 
gistics Management Institute Paper PA303RD1, 
March 1995. 
2
 Stiglitz [1986] offers the following exam- 
ple. Suppose there is cost-based pricing where 
the allowed price for the service provided by a 
government activity is the cost per unit of the 
service. Suppose further that performance is 
difficult to measure; and that the government 
activity attempts to maximize its budget. As- 
suming demand for the service is inelastic over 
some range (i.e. that demand is relatively in- 
sensitive to price increases), it would pay a 
monopoly activity "to increase the degree of 
inefficiency until the price (costs per unit of 
delivered service) were increased to [the bud- 
get maximizing price]." (p. 173) 
3
 Outsourcing involves "using federal 
funds to pay a private company to do defense 
work" while privatization "completely trans- 
fers [a DoD activity] to the private sector." 
(SECDEF Annual Report [1996] p.125) 
4
 The defining choice of any firm or orga- 
nization is to "make-or-buy" required interme- 
diate products. The "buy" options include open 
market purchases or supplier contracts (out- 
sourcing). The "make" option entails "owner- 
ship integration" of support services. The 
make-or-buy decision defines the boundaries of 
the organization. These management choices 
rely heavily on the "transactions costs" litera- 
ture. (Shugart, et. al. [1994]) Transactions costs 
consist of (1) search and information costs, (2) 
bargaining and decision costs, and (3) policing 
and enforcement costs. The choice of whether 
to purchase inputs in markets, to contract with 
suppliers, or to internalize the transaction de- 
pends on the marginal benefits and costs of 
each alternative. Relying on outside suppliers 
or markets involves price searches, quality con- 
cerns and security issues. Contracting with spe- 
cific suppliers involves negotiations and the 
writing and enforcement of contracts. Mean- 
while, a primary challenge of ownership inte- 
gration is the "principal-agent" problem. Prin- 
cipals (upper-level management) need to align 
the interests of their agents (lower level man- 
agers and workers) with their own. One ap- 
proach is to create an incentive structure that 
rewards efforts that help accomplish the prin- 
cipal's goals, but this necessarily includes the 
(costly) monitoring of performance. This paper 
models a specific incentive structure designed 
to motivate agents (support activities) to ac- 
complish the goal of achieving cost savings and 
efficiencies over time. 
5
 While Secretary of Defense Perry agrees 
that "outsourcing [certain] commercial activi- 
ties [such as depot maintenance and material 
supply management] holds promise to stream- 
line DoD support activities and to achieve cost 
savings," he concludes "the Department must 
carefully evaluate the extent to which we can 
achieve efficiencies." (DoD News Release No. 
470-95, 8/25/95) Meanwhile, the Commission 
acknowledges that, where there are "... diffi- 
culties in structuring appropriate contracts and 
establishing meaningful competition" (DD 
[1995] p.3-4), or where government activities 
depend on specialized, defense-unique re- 
sources (DoD Handbook [1995]), outsourcing 
may even be counterproductive. Moreover, ex- 
panding the DoD's use of contract support also 
"requires improving its abilities to create and 
administer those contracts, and to monitor con- 
tractor performance."(DD [1995] p.3-3) Another 
issue that remains is the current legislation that 
mandates a 60-40 split of support work be- 
tween DoD and private contractors. 
6
 A recent example is provided by the Brit- 
ish Government's attempt to regulate its newly 
privatized electric utilities ("How to Privatize," 
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The Economist, 3/11/95). When a support ac- 
tivity cannot be competitively outsourced, and 
cannot be competitively supplied in-house, it 
mav still be possible to control the activity via 
price regulations similar to Britain's so-called 
RPI-x method, (sec "Incredible," The Econo- 
mist, 3/11 /95) There, a regulated price is estab- 
lished and allowed to rise by no more than the 
retail price index (RPI) less some percentage, x. 
When the price cap's time is up, the regulator 
sets a new one for the next period. Under this 
svstem a regulated activity profits directly from 
anv cost savincs, at least until the next review. 
Britain's regulations essentially allow activities 
100".. gain-sharing for any cost savings 
achieved during the period the regulated price 
is in force. However, when a new cap is set, cost 
savings are passed on to consumers who re- 
ceive the full benefits from the price dropping 
to the new lower cost level. So far the evidence 
suggests that cost-based price regulation com- 
bined with gain-sharing has "delivered lower 
real prices to consumers." ("Disgusted," The 
Economist, 3/11/95) 
' Although if success-sharing is to be im- 
plemented in future contracts for the contrac- 
tor's benefit, then the DoD might consider shar- 
ing cost savings in the current contract (i.e. 
allowing contractors something less than 100% 
gain-sharing). 
8
 Another concern is that, with time-con- 
strained purchases, the "ease" of a purchase 
begins to take precedence over its cost-effec- 
tiveness. Moreover, as the fiscal year comes to a 
close, instead of pooling savings remaining to- 
wards the end of the year at a more aggregate 
level and evaluating remaining funding priori- 
tics globally, each activity has an incentive to 
use its budget on its own list of priorities, lead- 
ing to sub-optimal behavior. Increased over- 
sight of activities (e.g. monitoring, auditing, 
rules and regulations) often occurs in response 
to problems such as these. 
9
 Schick [1988] cites the extreme case of 
Ireland where the government "maintain[s] 
year-round financial control,. .. departments 
submit monthly spending plans at the start of 
the vear and month-by-month comparisons of 
actual and projected expenditure during the 
year... underexpenditure in any month is 
treated as a saving for the year and normally is 
not available for spending in a later month." 
(p.529) 
10
 The standard regulatory response also 
violates the National Performance Review's 
and Commission on Roles and Mission's goal 
to empower managers and workers at lower 
levels by decentralizing authority and encour- 
aging them to become more entrepreneurial: 
"DoD managers at all levels must be empow- 
ered to make sound business decisions based 
on broad policy guidance, rather than on de- 
tailed rules." (DD [1995] p.3-6) 
11
 If customers are given the freedom to 
choose between internal providers, or to "out- 
source," and/or if customers have the flexibil- 
ity to spend their funds on a variety of inputs, 
this freedom and flexibility can encourage fur- 
ther efficiencies in customer purchasing deci- 
sions and generate competitive pressure on in- 
ternal providers to lower costs and improve the 
product. 
12
 This assumption is not as innocent as it 
sounds. As noted by Pavia [1995]: "[m]ulti- 
product firms usually incur fixed costs which 
are difficult to attribute to the production of a 
particular output. This is a troublesome issue 
for firms that use production costs to establish 
prices. [Whereas] firms may avoid the problem 
by only looking at directly attributable [vari- 
able] costs," (p.1060) this can pose serious dif- 
ficulties. For example, if cost-based pricing is 
combined with gain-sharing, costs that are 
"counted" might be cut at the expense of those 
not counted, resulting in higher costs overall. A 
recent study by Rogerson [1995] offers sobering 
insights into problems that can arise under 
DBOF when costs are not assigned correctly in 
multiproduct organizations. Although not spe- 
cifically addressed here, these problems merit 
further attention. 
13
 Historically, certain DoD support activi- 
ties operated in so-called "revolving funds" 
that charged customers for products and ser- 
vices. The U.S. Military has used two primary 
types of revolving funds, stock funds and in- 
dustrial funds. Stock funds were used to pro- 
cure material and to hold inventory for resale to 
the operating forces, recovering only the cost of 
the material itself. Industrial funds provided 
services such as depot maintenance and trans- 
portation, recovering overhead costs in addi- 
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tion to material costs. The DBOF merged into 
one revolving fund, nine existing stock and 
industrial funds, along with five additional de- 
fense commercial operations or business activ- 
ities previously funded with direct appropri- 
ated funds. 
14
 For detailed information on the compo- 
sition and scope of each business area, see Ap- 
pendix C of the DBOF Handbook [1995]. 
15
 Activity-based costing (ABC) breaks 
down an organization into activities. The prin- 
cipal function of an activity is to convert re- 
sources (labor, materials, etc.) into outputs. 
While activities consume resources, customers 
consume activities. ABC systems: 1) identify 
the activities performed to produce outputs; 2) 
map the usage of organizational resources to 
these activities; 3) identify the outputs pro- 
duced; and 4) link the activity costs to the out- 
puts. 
16
 Alternatively, OSD could offer price sub- 
sidies that lower the price to in-house (DoD) 
customers. Also, to the extent internal costs 
exceed commercial rates, but in-house produc- 
tion is required to protect wartime mission ca- 
pability, OSD could either explicitly subsidize 
the difference, or act as the final customer. A 
useful avenue for future research is to examine 
the role of subsidies in DoD. 
17
 Customers determine and justify their 
anticipated requirements for goods and ser- 
vices they acquire from the DBOF business ar- 
eas. Resources required by customers to pur- 
chase business area products are subsequently 
identified in budget request documents. Budget 
documents are developed using projected rates 
and prices published by the DBOF business 
areas. 
18
 Final approved rate changes are estab- 
lished by the OUSD(C)and recorded in Pro- 
gram Budget Decision (PBD) documents: "For 
the DBOF business areas, the OUSD(C) reviews 
and approves all rates and prices developed... 
" (DBOF Handbook (1995]p.3-12) 
19
 The "death spiral" problem results in 
so-called "pass-through" funding requests to 
Congress. However, pass-through funding was 
originally designed only as a onetime correc- 
tion of the price structure to bring rates back 
down to a reasonable level. A conjecture is that 
this problem will become progressively more 
acute under current DBOF regulations. 
20
 The working hypothesis is that the pro- 
vision of a clear link between a support activi- 
ty's success in reducing costs (while preserving 
or increasing quality), and wages and job secu- 
rity, will motivate managers and employees to 
generate cost savings. The incentive problem 
can be broken down into two paprts: i.) external 
incentives provided to the activity to motivate 
cost savings, and ii.) the internal distribution of 
those incentives to motivate management and 
workers. This paper focuses on external incen- 
tives and leaves the important question of the 
distribution of internal incentives as an issue 
for further study. However, an expert on the 
latter offers that "[o]nce 'statistical control' is 
established, serious work [by management] to 
improve... [the] economy of production can 
commence." (Deming [1986] p.354) This paper 
studies two specific external incentives de- 
signed to reward the "economy of production": 
namely gain-sharing and success-sharing. 
21
 This unit-cost function, C(Q), is also as- 
sumed to be stable over time. This assumption 
is important because in reality, cost functions 
are stochastic and subject to exogenous (ran- 
dom) shocks in input prices. (Deming [1986]) If 
exogenous shocks (unforeseen resource price 
increases, natural disasters, wars, etc.) create 
cost increases which camouflage an activity's 
true cost saving efforts, then appropriate incen- 
tives may not be awarded to the activities when 
they were, in fact, deserved. Thus, if gain-shar- 
ing and success-sharing under unit-cost-based 
transfer pricing is to be successful, it must be 
possible for financial accounting systems to 
separate exogenous cost changes (e.g. higher 
fuel prices) from an activity's endogenous cost 
savings (e.g. a new inventory policy). Although 
not specifically addressed here, this more com- 
plex problem deserves further attention. 
22
 These cost-reducing innovations could 
be as simple as introducing modifications to the 
procurement process that allow credit card pur- 
chases and encourage the use of commercial 
specifications, to more involved changes that 
require rewriting rules & regulations governing 
travel, personnel actions, and part-time em- 
ployment. In the model, it makes no difference 
whether cost savings result from an application 
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of new technology, improved employee coop- 
eration and information sharing that reduces 
errors, rework and wasted materials, or from 
employee education and training. 
2l
 Orvis, et.al. [1992] offer an interesting 
review of one DoD gain-sharing experiment 
conducted at Sacramento's Air Logistics Center 
called PACER SHARE. Although difficult to 
evaluate, apparently "Sacramento displayed] a 
tendency toward cost savings under PACER 
SHARE relative to its baseline,.. . " (p..121) 
24
 In contrast to the way investment costs 
are treated in the model, under current DBOF 
policies, "[c]apital expenditures... for new cap- 
ital assets. .. arc financed through depreciation 
or capital surcharge rates included in prices." 
(DBOF Handbook [1995]p.3-ll) 
2-1
 Although g and s arc fixed over time for 
purposes of the model, an interesting extension 
would be to examine the case where gain-shar- 
ing and success-sharing is not constant over 
time. 
2
' In the case of DBOF, business areas are 
organizations within the department, and sav- 
ings in DBOF business areas arc savings in the 
department, and the savings result in increased 
operating revenue for the war fighters. There- 
fore, one might assume that public servants 
already have the motivation to seek cost-sav- 
ings. However, due to the current price-setting 
rules in DBOF and from the history of non- 
profits, our model assumes further cost-savings 
could be motivated through organizational in- 
centives that offer something similar to a "prof- 
it motive." For example, one of the most strik- 
ing changes taking place in business today is 
the dramatic reshaping of compensation plans. 
Incentive pay plans are rapidly spreading from 
the executive suite to the shop floor. Incentive 
pay plans set the compensation of workers and 
top management according to how well the 
company achieves a number of preset objec- 
tives. The most widely employed is profit- (or 
gain-) sharing, whereby employees receive an- 
nual bonuses based on corporate profit perfor- 
mance. More than 30% of US companies em- 
ploy some form of profit- or gain-sharing, 
However, the design of an effective and fair 
incentive pay plan is a daunting challenge. Pay 
must be closely linked to performance mea- 
sures that managers and employees can di- 
rectly influence. Moreover, the marginal impact 
of each employee's effort must be separated 
from the influence of others and more general 
company-wide or economy-wide influences. 
Each of these considerations is relevant to the 
current model, and offers opportunities for fu- 
ture research, (also see Hirschey &Pappas 
[1995]p.339) 
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